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INTRODUCTION 
 
STUDENTS, MIDDLE AMERICANS,  
AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
 
In the summer of 1962, members of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) met 
at the United Auto Workers  (UAW) campground in Port Huron, Michigan to discuss a 
provocative document drafted by SDS leader Tom Hayden.
1
  The ensuing, intense debate 
produced The Port Huron Statement, a “living document” which served as the organization’s 
manifesto and an “agenda for a generation.”  The manuscript expressed the students’ anxiety 
about growing up in the midst of the Cold War and their indignation towards the hypocrisy of 
discrimination in the United States.  Though The Port Huron Statement presented an 
ambiguous ideal of “participatory democracy,” its critique of the labor movement is direct 
and decisive.  The students labeled the labor movement “too quiescent” and “indifferent.”
 2
  
They accused organized labor of being self-interested, its traditional radicalism sacrificed to 
institutionalization.  The critique accused labor leaders of “elitism,” and claimed “rank-and-
                                                
1
 The terms used to examine this topic—SDS, New Left, student movement, labor, UAW, working class, 
middle class—are contestable. SDS refers to that specific organization, and UAW is also used specifically.  
New Left and student movement refer to the general leftist campus rebellion of the 1960s (which included the 
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) in the South, the Northern Student Movement (NSM), 
and the Berkeley Free Speech Movement, among others) and are used when applicable beyond SDS 
specifically.  Similarly, labor unions/the labor movement is used when referring to trends that extend beyond 
the UAW in particular.  Note that “labor” refers to organized labor.  Working class and middle class are perhaps 
the most complicated terms within this list, and are used to extend beyond unions or students, respectively, in 
particular.  These terms can be a point of contention, and their use will be as purposeful as possible. 
2
 Students for a Democratic Society, The Port Huron Statement (1962), cited indicates appendix of James 
Miller, Democracy is in the Streets: From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1987), 343-344. 
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file apathy to the tradition of unionism” that produced an institutionalized and thus 
compromised organization, the victim of “accommodation and limited effectiveness.”
3
 
SDS represented one of the most influential organizations of the larger New Left 
movement, the loosely defined title for the progressive student movement or rebellion of the 
1960s.  Historians and cultural memory frequently reduce the general relationship between 
organized labor and the New Left to certain individual moments of the decade.
4
  As SDS 
member Todd Gitlin observed when his student equated SDS and the Weathermen: “the 
passing of time shrouds the ‘60s; the end is confounded with the beginning, the consequences 
with the causes; the all-important sequence of events is obscured.  Our collective memory, 
such as it is, rests on a few disjointed images snatched out of order.”
5
  Events such as the 
violence accompanying the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago and the New 
York City Hard Hat Riots of May 1970 are often cited as exemplars of the tension between 
students and workers.  On May 8, 1970, construction workers attacked a group of students 
peacefully demonstrating in response to the fatal shooting of four students at Kent State 
University in Ohio.  The “hard hats” marched to Wall Street, where they beat the 
demonstrators and forced the flag at city hall returned to full-mast—it had been flying at 
half-mast for a day of reflection in honor of the murdered students. The worker attack was 
pre-meditated, and was reported to police ahead of time.
6
  Multiple histories of SDS and the 
                                                
3
 SDS, The Port Huron Statement, 373. 
4
 Historian Bruce Schulman studied the way that the New Left and the counterculture are taught in American 
classrooms.  He found that, “the New Left and the counterculture ‘receive almost no sympathetic treatment’ in 
the classroom.  Instead, campus protestors are frequently cast as childish and starry-eyed, and the New Left is 
depicted as a short-lived episode of white protest, a mere intermediary between the civil rights movement and 
‘the emerging movements for women’s rights, gay rights, and multiculturalism.’”  Usually only The Port Huron 
Statement and the 1964 Berkeley Free Speech Movement are mentioned. 
Schulman quoted in John McMillan,  “‘You Didn’t Have to Be There’: Revisiting the New Left Consensus,” 
The New Left Revisited, eds. John McMillan and Paul Buhle (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003), 2. 
5
 Todd Gitlin, The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage (New York: Bantam Book, 1987), 184. 
6
 Martin Arnold, “Police Were Told of Plan,” The New York Times, 9 May 1970, 1. 
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Although undeniable tension existed between the middle-class students and the 
working-class unionists, numerous instances of cooperation between students and unions also 
occurred throughout the sixties.  Not only did the UAW camp serve as the setting for the 
debate over The Port Huron Statement, but SDS and the UAW consistently articulated their 
goal of a worker-student alliance.  One of the most significant cooperative efforts occurred in 
1964, when the UAW provided the initial funding for one of SDS’s most important 
endeavors, the Economic Research and Action Project (ERAP).  Although SDS issued papers 
with titles or sections specifically addressing students and labor and often called for a 
“worker-student alliance,” they simultaneously voiced explicit criticism of the labor 
movement.  SDS, an undoubtedly middle-class organization, declared students the “new 
working class,” positioning them as the vanguard to replace the labor movement as the 
progressive left.  The radicalization of SDS over the course of the sixties made keeping 
UAW support increasingly difficult. 
SDS prematurely abandoned ERAP in favor of the more imperative organizing 
opportunity provided by the burgeoning Vietnam anti-war movement.  Although history 
often portrays the anti-war movement and its associated backlash as emblematic of the 
sixties, this tendency creates too simplistic a dichotomy for the decade as a whole, and 
consequently for the relationship between students and workers within that decade.  In the 
biography of UAW President Walter P. Reuther, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: 
Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor, labor historian Nelson Lichtenstein claims 
                                                
7
 These include Irwin Unger’s The Movement: A History of the American New Left 1959-1972 (New York: 




that a split between the working and middle class within the labor movement injured the 
broader postwar liberal consensus: “Unions are weak in the United States because of a larger 
fragmentation in the character of American liberalism.”
8
  Lichtenstein’s choice of words is 
critical.  Fragmentation can only occur if there is a solid entity that can be broken.  However 
complicated, a relationship did exist.  The complex and uneasy coalition between SDS and 
the UAW reflected the conflicts within the postwar liberal consensus that would be 
challenged by the political debate surrounding the Vietnam War. 
As student organizations took the lead in both the Civil Rights Movement and the 
New Left—the two most direct internal challenges to postwar American liberalism—many 
working-class Americans expressed anger with the young protestors.  In 1968 a Newsweek 
cover piece on “The Troubled American” reported that a definite mandate of the 
whitewashed “middle class” surveyed disapproved of the students’ actions.  These troubled 
Americans perceived an “anti-middle class bias” among the college radicals.
9
  The friction 
between the “privileged” students and the “ignorant” working class, as they purportedly saw 
each other, obscured what the two groups had in common: the belief that government had 
failed.  Though they blamed each other at least in part for the crisis, by 1968 both students 





Both SDS and the UAW were intrinsically tied to the growing American middle 
class: the UAW provided the primary agency for blue-collar autoworkers’ upward mobility 
                                                
8
  Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor 
(Chicago: BasicBooks, 1995), 441. 
9
 “The Troubled American: A Special Report on the White Majority,” Newsweek (6 October 1969), 31, 33. 
10
 Richard Lemon, The Troubled American (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), 35. 
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from working to middle class and SDS articulated a constant cognizance of the middle-class 
origins of its collegiate membership.
11
  Both groups were intimately bound to the American 
Dream, and to insuring that the promises inherent in that Dream—work, a home, and overall 
security—were accessible.  What they recognized as perversion and disruption of the Dream, 
and not necessarily its categorical existence, motivated each group.  Justly fearful of red-
baiting, in truth neither organized labor nor the student movement sought to fundamentally 
change American government.  Instead they tried to uphold that government to its own ideals 
and promises.  Though still a vital and powerful constituency of the Democratic vote, the 
increasingly institutionalized labor movement faced new challenges in the postwar United 
States, and the impetus for progressive liberalism swung to the emerging student movement. 
SDS’s ideology, expressed in The Port Huron Statement, is more a reflection of the 
students’ upbringing in the 1950s than of the political climate that emerged in the 1960s and 
would later define the decade.  As Todd Gitlin said of the fifties: “The surprises of the Sixties 
were planted there.”
12
  The Port Huron Statement’s prevailing anxiety is clearly a result of 
Cold War tension.  Michael Harrington—socialist, labor activist, author of the seminal anti-
poverty exposé The Other America, and a constant and complicated presence in the life of the 
New Left—reflected on the development of the student movement in a 1969 essay, “The 
Mystical Militants.”  In the essay, Harrington provided an insightful analysis of the younger 
generation’s fifties childhood.  Their upbringing inculcated an idealized portrait of the United 
States.  The belief in those principles resulted in the feelings of betrayal that provoked 
                                                
11
 In the 1960s, the postwar baby boom and the exponential growth of the American middle class created an 
unprecedented population of college students in the United States.  The G.I. Bill, Federal Housing 
Administration loans, and a booming economy allowed an increasing number of middle class Americans to give 
their children a higher education.  SDS recognized the organizing potential of this new American social class, 
however transient. 
12
 Gitlin, The Sixties, 22. 
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political activism in the small minority of baby boomers constituting SDS.  They challenged 
American ideals because they believed in them.  The members of SDS did not become 
radicalized in order to destroy the American system; they were radical in the sense that they 
sought to uphold that system to the values that it instilled in their generation: “They seemed 
to have believed what they were told about freedom, equality, justice, world peace, and the 
like.  They became activists in order to affirm these traditional values.”
13
  Harrington 
attributed the ideology of the New Left to their unique historical moment: “It is, I suspect, 
this unique fifties-sixties experience which gives the New Left its distinctive flavor: a sense 
of outrage, of having been betrayed by all the father figures, which derives from an original 
innocence.  And it is also the source of the young radicals’ insistence on sincerity and 
community.”
14
  Harrington later called himself a “father figure” to SDS, several of whom 
were “red-diaper babies” with genetic links to socialist and communist politics, including the 
labor movement.  In his assessment, Harrington emphasized the anti-Communist standard of 
the student movement, pointing out that SDS derived “from a sense of the immediate 
contradiction between democratic posturing and the undemocratic reality.  They descend 
from the abolitionists and Wobblies, not from Marx.”
15
  The radicalism of the New Left 
represented a return to original American values and ideals, not an intent to turn the United 
States towards communist, socialist, or other subversive revolution. 
Their shared ideological foundation implied a common ground between labor and the 
New Left.  At the 1962 National Student Association conference in Ohio, SDS distributed a 
pamphlet entitled “Campus Parties: An Illiberal Projection” that addressed the student 
                                                
13
 Michael Harrington, “The Mystical Militants,” Beyond the New Left, ed. Irving Howe (New York: McCall 
Publishing Company, 1970), 34. 
14
 Harrington, “The Mystical Militants,” 34. 
15
 Ibid., 34. 
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movement’s role as a buttress to American liberalism and a watchdog for democracy, even 
down to the level of campus politics.  Members Rennard (Rennie) Davis and Bruce Payne, 
writing for SDS, undoubtedly included the labor movement in their description of the 
American radical tradition when they wrote, “The goals of almost every American reform 
movement, including those of students, have been derived from that tradition – from the Bill 
of Rights, from the ideal of equality before the law, from the hope that liberty and equality 





Although most histories of the New Left and certain labor histories touch on the 
relationship between the student and labor movements, few texts specifically examine that 
relationship—Peter Levy’s Labor and the New Left in the 1960s being the prominent 
exception.  There is a historiographical space for an explicit, concentrated study of the 
relationship between the labor movement and the student movement in the sixties.  
Furthermore, exploration of the specific relationship between SDS and the UAW provides 
insight into the larger connections between the New Left and labor unions, between students 
and the workers, and between the middle and working class. 
Organizational heritage linked SDS to the labor movement.  In his biography of 
Reuther, historian and former SDS member Nelson Lichtenstein claims that the student 
movement and the labor movement were only united for a brief period of time: 
Reuther’s quest for an opening to the left in American politics not only led to 
the podium of his union’s 1964 convention in Atlantic City, […] but could be 
found in the balcony, where virtually all of the leadership of the Students for a 
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 Rennard Davis and Bruce Payne, “Campus Political Parties, an Illiberal Projection,” Student Activists 
Collection, Box 7, Folder 14, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University. 
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Democratic Society sat in attendance.  They were there because Reuther 
invited them, but more important, because for this brief moment in the history 




In his perhaps idealized portrait of this moment of compatibility, Lichtenstein emphasizes the 
common political goals of the two organizations without elaborating on their divergent 
political positions.  Conversely, in her biography, Reuther: A Daughter Strikes, Elisabeth 
Reuther Dickmeyer presented a very different perspective of the relationship between the 
UAW and SDS: “But father found the ‘SDS kids,’ as he called them, very hard to reach.  A 
product of the 1960s, the Students for a Democratic Society were known for their radical 
politics and violent measures for achieving their goals.  Their favorite stratagem was to storm 
a university’s administration building, take it over, smash equipment, destroy documents, and 
demand that the administrators be fired.”
18
  Dickmeyer’s statement demonstrates a 
fundamental misconstruction of the student movement, a result of both media manipulation 
and internal factionalization within SDS.  The phrase “SDS kids,” which enjoyed widespread 
use in contemporary mass media, is inherently condescending.  Furthermore, SDS, as The 
Port Huron Statement reveals, emerged out of the Cold War culture of the 1950s.  This is 
clear in The Port Huron Statement, which illustrated an underlying Cold War anxiety.  SDS 
formed in the early sixties, years which are more culturally congruent with the fifties than 
with the late sixties.  The “violent measures” and “favorite stratagem” Dickmeyer cited only 
applied to later SDS, when the organization shared merely a name with its earlier self. 
Dickmeyer’s statement exemplifies the misconstruction of SDS, which often extends 
to all of the sixties. Accurate in part for the final, turbulent years, her statement is for both the 
                                                
17
 Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit, 390-391. 
18
 Elisabeth Reuther Dickmeyer, Reuther: A Daughter Strikes (Southfield: Spelman Publishers Division, 
Spelman, Inc., 1989), 323. 
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sixties and SDS a false definition.
19
  Despite skepticism about the labor movement from the 
outset, SDS frequently sought common ground on which to forge a worker-student alliance.  
Despite their criticism of the later methods of militant factions, the UAW and Reuther in 
particular supported SDS.  The truth of the relationship between students and workers in the 
sixties lies somewhere in the middle of Lichtenstein’s and Dickmeyer’s claims.  They did not 
exactly share specific agendas, but SDS and the UAW did share political goals; but the two 
groups disagreed on how best to accomplish those goals.  On the other hand, SDS and the 
UAW, especially Reuther, were not as disconnected as Dickmeyer suggested.  As 
Lichtenstein points out, “Reuther saw these young people as a bridge through which the labor 
movement could rewin the loyalty and appreciation of young intellectuals and energize its 
white-collar organizing campaign.”
20
  Reuther actively cultivated a relationship between his 
union and the students, and although problematic, that liaison sustained itself until the 
escalation of the Vietnam War.  By that time, however, SDS had ceased to be the same 
organization that convened at Port Huron.  Unable to sustain its rapid growth propelled by 
the anti-war movement, SDS suffered from a lack of leadership and decentralization and 
radical anarchist and Marxist-Leninist factions dominated the student movement in the late 
sixties.  Unfortunately, historical focus on moments of confrontation from that time, like the 
Hard Hat Riots, obscure the previous years of the decade.
21
 
                                                
19
 Thomas Frank points out in The Conquest of Cool that the conservative historical vision of the decade “is 
undermined by their insistence on understanding ‘the sixties’ as a causal force in and of itself and their curious 
blurring of the lines between various historical actors: counter-culture equals Great Society equals left equals 
‘sixties generation,’ all of them driven by some mysterious impulse to tear down Western Civilization.” Thomas 
Frank, The Conquest of Cool: Business Culture, Counterculture, and the Rise of Hip Consumerism (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1997), 3. 
20
 Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit, 391. 
21
 A substantial body of historical literature specifically examines the turbulence in 1968.  This includes Walter 
LaFeber’s Deadly Bet: LBJ, Vietnam, and the 1968 Election, David Caute’s The Year of the Barricades: A 
Journey Through 1968, David Farber’s Chicago ’68, and Mark J. Davis’ film 1968, Young blood. 
10 
 
Though incidents from the sixties like the Hard Hat Riots are sometimes used as 
examples of a liberal-labor divide, placing labor unions and student radicals on opposing 
sides, much more reciprocity existed, especially in the earlier years of the decade.  A 
synthesis of existing historical analysis of the working and middle classes, of SDS and the 
New Left, of Reuther and the UAW, and of the breakdown of postwar liberalism, combined 
with contemporary publications and archived documents will illuminate the multi-faceted 
relationship between SDS and the UAW in the 1960s and ultimately provide a deeper 
understanding of some of the trends that have defined postwar American politics. 
SDS wrote prolifically.  They issued countless working papers, circulated several 
newsletters, and published articles in various outlets.  An early publication, the article 
“American Student Requires Value Stimulation,” appeared in the August 6, 1960 edition of 
the University of Michigan’s campus newspaper The Michigan Daily.  In it, Daily editor and 
author Tom Hayden, who would later author of The Port Huron Statement, argued that there 
are two types of students: the majority interested in “private welfare” over the public good, 
whereas the minority “holds an inverse set of values, belief in social action,” and a 
commitment to idealism.  Hayden concluded, “The spirit of self-determination in America 
receded with the frontier.  It has bowed to the vast industrial and organizational expansion of 
the last 75 years.  As a result, the majority of students feel helpless to chart their society’s 
direction.  The purpose of the student movements, then, is at once simple and profound: to 
prove human beings are still the measure.  Hopefully, this will be proven.”
22
  Hayden’s 
argument reflected parallels between the goals of the labor movement and the student 
movement.  Both were trying to “prove human beings are still the measure,” but each 
                                                
22
 Tom Hayden, “American Student Requires Value Stimulation,” The Michigan Daily (6 August 1960). 
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certainly misunderstood the other in the 1960s, and simplified histories often misrepresent 
each now. 
Several comprehensive historical accounts of the postwar working class are useful 
material for a study of SDS and the UAW.
23
  These historians provide a revealing portrayal 
of the working-class position in postwar American politics, but they do not focus on the 
relationship between unions and the student movement—nor do they purport or attempt to do 
so.  These analyses of the working class are useful for their insight into the nuanced, complex 
opinions and reactions of the labor movement, and its role as a vital and sometimes definitive 
component of the working class.
24
  Several historians have published thorough accounts of 
the history of the New Left and of SDS specifically, including members of the group like 
Tom Hayden and Todd Gitlin.
25
  Despite this wealth of literature, the only work of New Left 
scholarship to examine in detail the specific relationship between students and workers is 
Peter Levy’s Labor and the New Left in the 1960s.  Levy’s approach is much broader than 
                                                
23
 For excellent analyses of the American working class: Jefferson Cowie, “‘Vigorously Left, Right, and 
Center’: The Crosscurrents of Working-Class America in the 1970s,” in America in the Seventies, edited by 
Barbara Bailey and David Farber; Stanley Greenberg, Middle Class Dreams: The Politics and Power of the 
New American Majority; Barbara Ehrenreich, Fear of Falling: The Inner Life of the Middle Class; Mike Davis, 
Prisoners of the American Dream: Politics and Economics in the History of the U.S. Working Class; Joel 
Rogers and Ruy Teixeira. America's Forgotten Majority: Why the White Working Class Still Matters. 
24
 In addition to Lichtenstein’s biography The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of 
American Labor, there are a multitude of histories of the UAW that briefly touch on the union’s relationship 
with SDS, including John Barnard’s American Vanguard: The United Auto Workers During the Reuther Years, 
1935-1970, Dudley W. Buffa’s Union Power and American Democracy: The UAW and the Democratic Party, 
Martin Halpern’s UAW Politics in the Cold War Era, and Irving Howe’s UAW and Walter Reuther. 
25
 Furthermore, outstanding and revealing portraits of the New Left and of SDS specifically are abundant 
among the mass of literature about the sixties.  One of the most useful and engaging is James Miller’s 
biographical portrait of SDS, Democracy is in the Streets: From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago. Several 
SDS members published their own accounts of the movement, including Todd Gitlin’s The Sixties: Years of 
Hope Days of Rage and The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New 
Left, and Tom Hayden’s Rebellion in Newark: Official Violence and Ghetto Response, account of the 
prosecution of the Chicago Seven in Trial, and Reunion: A Memoir.  Several other general histories of SDS are 
available, including Kirkpatrick Sale’s succinctly titled SDS.  G. Louis Heath provides a both a brief overall 
history and a compilation of mostly late sixties SDS literature in Vandals in the Bomb Factory: The History and 
Literature of Students for a Democratic Society.  Several anthologies of contemporary literature are available, 
including The New Left: An Anthology edited by Mitchell Cohen and Beyond the New Left edited by Irving 
Howe.  One of the most exceptional anthologies is necessarily retrospective: The New Left Revisited, edited by 
John McMillan and Paul Buhle, is a compilation of scholarship that focuses on the work of a new generation of 
historians not actually witness to the student movement. 
12 
 
the one here, which focuses on SDS and the UAW specifically.  Levy likewise argues for a 
more dialectic approach to the relationship between labor and the New Left.  He emphasizes 
that the conflicts between labor and the New Left “emerged not because of inherent middle-
class or antiworker bias, but rather due to much more historically specific factors.”
 26
  
Namely, the escalation of three external events: the Vietnam War, Black Power, and the 
counterculture.  This thesis focuses on the Vietnam War combined with internal challenges to 
the coalition.  Although Black Power and the counterculture did affect the final downfall, 
they are a more prominent factor for Levy because of his broader approach. 
The goal of this thesis will be to examine the intersections between the student and 
labor movement in the sixties by studying the relationship between SDS and the UAW.  The 
two organizations, which represent the middle and working class, respectively, often found 
themselves working toward parallel goals.  Chapter One recounts the origins of SDS, which 
connect it to the labor movement, and explains their self-conception as a liberal-labor liaison.  
Chapter Two presents the Economic Research and Action Project, a brief but remarkable 
effort at community organizing in poor communities and a direct collaboration between SDS 
and the UAW.  Chapter Three centers on the relationship of each SDS and the UAW to the 
Democratic Party, and the way that the explosive events of 1968 exposed the fundamental 
and unavoidably divisive differences between the strategies of the two organizations.  Even 
in 1968, SDS still sought alliance with unions, and the UAW leadership still supported the 
basic thrust of the student movement.  However, each suffered from rank-and-file deviation: 
militant and Marxist factions eventually overtook SDS, and the UAW leadership was 
shocked by the anger within union locals.  
                                                
26
 Peter Levy, Labor and the New Left in the 1960s (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 6. 
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Two dominant, related threads emerge.  The first, reinforced by historians like Peter 
Levy and Jefferson Cowie, argues that elevating events like the 1970 Hard Hat Riots as an 
icon of a liberal-labor schism creates too simple a dichotomy.  Although palpable tension 
between labor unions and the student protestors fed into these events, images of extreme 
manifestations hurt both sides of the alleged divide.  Labor unionists were not all racist “hard 
hats,” and students were not all anarchist hippies.  The second arterial argument defining the 
relationship between SDS and the UAW extends deeper than an image problem, down to 
decisions each group made about its relationship to mainstream liberalism. Beyond the 
symbolic events, even in issues that the UAW and SDS agreed upon—like a shared 
investment in the “maximum feasible participation” of the poor population in the programs 
of the Johnson administration’s War on Poverty—the way that each group related to the 
American political structure made some conflict inevitable.  The UAW strategically 
positioned itself as a pressure group within the Democratic Party.  On the other hand, from 
The Port Huron Statement SDS had announced that it would work from the grassroots level 
in order to pressure liberalism from the grassroots.  Working from outside the Democratic 
Party allowed SDS to break with and even challenge party platform.  Although labor leaders 
like Reuther hoped that the students would be a “bridge” for the labor movement, and the 
students wrote about a “natural alliance,” active decisions about each group’s relationship to 
the Democratic establishment complicated the way they related to each other, creating a basic 
divide that became insurmountable once the Vietnam War escalated.  SDS could not support 
a presidential candidate who supported the war, the UAW had to support the Democratic 
Party although it pushed the Party to adopt a peace platform, and the refusal of the 
Democrats to do so meant that the UAW and SDS could no longer occupy the same political 
14 
 
coalition. Thus, the failure of liberalism resulted not as much from the misunderstanding of 
hippies and hardhats, but represents a political tragedy stemming from liberal-labor structural 
opposition. The Vietnam War exposed the “liberal-labor divide,” but it was not the divide 






Students for a Democratic Society repeatedly redefined itself throughout its lifetime, 
resulting in contention even within the organization as to the exact date of its birth.  SDS’s 
identity crisis involved its relationship with the League for Industrial Democracy, between 
the students and the “Old” Left, and between the students and liberal allies such as the labor 
unions.  Two competing descriptions of the group provided in literature about the SDS 
Economic Research and Action Project, their first real concentrated activist effort, provide 
evidence of SDS’s identity crisis.  One pamphlet, “Economic Research and Action Project — 
An Introduction,” claimed that SDS was “founded in 1905 by Upton Sinclair, Jack London, 
Clarence Darrow, and others as an organization dedicated to democratic values, civil 
liberties, liberal education and a peaceful world.”
1
  Throughout its lifespan, SDS struggled 
with the nature of its relationship with its parent organization, the League for Industrial 
Democracy (LID).  More immediate than whether to equate SDS with the Intercollegiate 
Socialist Society (ISS), the 1905 organization this description referred to, is whether to 
equate SDS of 1969 with SDS of 1962. 
Another pamphlet for ERAP described SDS as “an association of young people on 
the left who seek alternatives to poverty, racism, corporate or military rule in public affairs 
and government which people no longer control.  Its members work for a democracy which 
gives people a say in the decisions which affect their lives […] SDS as it is now constituted 
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was organized in 1960.”
2
  Fifty-five years is a substantial discrepancy; however, even in the 
latter example, the phrase “as it is now constituted” still suggests some link to SDS’s past.  A 
more general introduction stated simply, “SDS was born in 1960 with the student movement 
itself.”
3
  A still different introduction proclaimed SDS to have been founded with The Port 
Huron Statement in 1962, and named the conditions “giving birth to our present movement”: 
the Cold War, Joseph McCarthy, and “the silent generation filing into heavily-mortgaged 
Ozzie and Harriet suburbia.”
4
  SDS examined, contested, and challenged all of these 
relationships as it began to galvanize the student movement in the first half of the sixties. 
This confusion over the origins of SDS demonstrated the fluid relationship between 
the student organization and its predecessors.  The relationship between SDS and prior 
student movements, as well as between SDS and traditional liberal allies, was a consistent 
topic of discussion throughout the evolution of the organization.  Historian G. Louis Heath 
pointed out: “Knowing what SDS was not in its formative years is as important as knowing 
what it was.” 
5
 Over a single decade SDS’s goals and strategy transformed significantly.  
What SDS was, in the beginning, not is important to the later development of the student 
movement, especially in its relation to the labor movement.  Heath clarified that SDS was not 
revolutionary, but “anxious to use the democratic process to bring about changes in a society 
which SDS felt needed to develop new priorities and reform,” that it possessed a socialist 
tendency but was not communist, and that SDS “was often critical of the way in which 
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government, business, and the decision-makers in America operated, but it was not—at the 
outset—anti-Establishment.”
6
  As SDS emerged, the organization continued to define its 
relation to the larger society and to liberalism and its different elements, including a constant 
consideration of the prospects of a worker-student alliance. 
 
THE LEAGUE FOR INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 
 The history of SDS began—at least according to some—with the founding of the 
Intercollegiate Socialist Society (ISS) in 1905.  The name of the organization changed to the 
League for Industrial Democracy (LID) in 1921, and it organized a student corollary, known 
as SLID.  Labor union contributions helped finance the LID, a national organization 
headquartered in New York.  Interestingly, the Reuther brothers were involved with the LID 
at Detroit City College in the 1930s.  As young activists, they participated in demonstrations 
against the establishment of an ROTC on campus and in 1932 against the segregation policy 
of a Detroit apartment building swimming pool.
 7
  The relationship of the university with the 
Defense Department and discrimination both remained central causes to SLID as it morphed 
into SDS.  SLID merged briefly with the National Student League
8
 in 1935 to form the 
American Student Union, until in 1946 the group revived the name SLID in the wake of 
World War II.  Campus activity experienced a post-war slump in the “silent fifties;” but the 
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Civil Rights Movement arrived in the final years of that decade, and the atmosphere on 
campus began to change.
9
 
The budding student organization advanced towards autonomy in 1958, when they 
decided to rename the unfortunately pronounced SLID.  Robert Alan Haber pointed out in a 
letter to Charles Van Tassel that, “SLID is not a name which easily meets the public.”
 10
  
Nonetheless, Haber clearly wanted to maintain an explicit connection to the LID, pointing 
out that, “we do not wish by a name change to sever the historical continuity of the 
organization. […]  SLID, by that name, has a very definite meaning to a certain group of 
people and it has a place in the history of American liberal activity.  That is something we 
can be proud of.”
 11
  Evidently, SDS’s pride in its heritage and place in a continuing liberal 
tradition outweighed any deviance from LID policies.  In the letter, Haber continued to 
exhaustively discuss the intricacies of a name change for the newly energized student 
organization for more than a full single-spaced typewritten page.  Obviously, the 
nomenclature would help to define the direction of the emerging organization.  The Ann 
Arbor SLID, the principle force behind the transition from SLID to SDS, ultimately agreed 
upon the title Students for a Democratic Society in 1960.  The moniker embodied the key 
aspects of the organization that Haber wished to project “1) we are students, 2) we have an 
action orientation, 3) we are concerned with a broad range of problems, 4) our aim is one of 
democratic change and progress. […] the paramount value of the group is the necessity for 
the Individual to act, to participate in the democratic process.  We wish to inculcate this value 
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and stimulate students to accept their responsibility of citizenship.”
12
  The student movement 
had officially made a name for itself, though at this point SDS was still in all but name 
connected to the LID.  By the beginning of the sixties, both students and labor were seeking a 
new political voice that was certainly not Republican, but also not quite Democratic in the 
contemporary party-line sense. 
 
THE PORT HURON STATEMENT: “AN AGENDA FOR A GENERATION” 
James Miller pronounced The Port Huron Statement  “one of the most pivotal 
documents in post-war American history.”
13
  The manuscript earned its title from the 
discussion held at the UAW camp in Port Huron, Michigan, in the summer of 1962.  Tom 
Hayden wrote the draft, it was distributed amongst the SDS leadership, and sixty people from 
SDS and select interested parties met in Port Huron to debate the document.  From the time 
of its writing in 1962 through the subsequent five years, SDS distributed over 100,000 copies 
of The Port Huron Statement, which stands as the first manifesto of the movement which 
would come to be called the New Left.
14
  At its core, The Port Huron Statement expressed a 
sincere belief in the fundamental American values of democracy; however, it also pointed out 
where those values had been degraded and tarnished.  The document began, “We are people 
of this generation, bred in at least modest comfort, housed now in universities, looking 
uncomfortably to the world we inherit.”
15
  This statement reflected some of the primary 
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defining aspects of SDS: the generational consciousness of the students, their cognizance of 
their middle-class status, their demographic identification as students, and their anxiety. 
As SDS member Bob Rose remembered of the sessions at Port Huron, “The issue 
was: could students change society without labor?”
16
  Members of the “silent generation,” a 
group widely criticized for its apathy, SDS recognized the hypocrisy and paradoxes of 
American postwar liberalism that boiled over in the riots and protests of the later part of the 
decade.  In The Port Huron Statement, SDS acknowledged that the members of SDS were in 
the minority on the college campus, and that despite recent activity, “The real campus, the 
familiar campus, is a place of private people […] of commitment to business-as-usual, 
getting ahead, playing it cool […] [and] mass reluctance toward the controversial public 
stance.”
 17
  However, SDS did not blame the students for their inaction: “But apathy is not 
simply an attitude; it is a product of social institutions, and of the structure and organization 
of higher education itself.”
 18
  This structure, built around in loco parentis and “a radical 
separation of the student from the material of study,” encouraged detachment and inaction, 
and “the student learns by his isolation to accept elite rule within the university, which 
prepares him to accept later forms of minority control.”
 19
  Thus, the student left the 
university intellectually unchallenged, but instead prepared to enter the society at large and 
continue a life of “modest comfort.” 
In 1962, SDS retained faith that the American system could be reformed and need not 
be abandoned completely.  The Port Huron Statement claimed that, “The significance is in 
the fact that students are breaking the crust of apathy and overcoming the inner alienation 
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that remain the defining characteristics of American college life.”
20
  Growing up believing 
whole-heartedly in the promises of the American Dream, this minority group of baby 
boomers began to realize the restrictions and hypocrisy of that dream when they reached the 
university and “began to see complicated and disturbing paradoxes in our surrounding 
America.” Namely, the “proclaimed peaceful intentions of the United States contradicted its 
economic and military investments in the Cold War status quo.”
 21
  The inequality in the 
South, exposed in widespread television coverage of the Civil Rights Movement, 
contradicted the idea that in the United States “all men are created equal.”  Their upbringing 
had instilled in them a generational consciousness which manifested in a sense of 
responsibility for the American values that they had grown up believing in, and upon 
maturation had found to be contradictory to their reality. 
In The Port Huron Statement, SDS offered the diagnosis: “what we had originally 
seen as the American Golden Age was actually the decline of an era.”
22
  In many respects, 
SDS sought to provoke the United States into fulfilling the broken promises of that previous 
era.  SDS offered a particular utopian vision of “participatory democracy” and an agenda that 
strove to hold the United States responsible for the promises of liberalism—work, a home, 
and overall security.  The Port Huron Statement extended its criticism of apathy on the 
campus to a larger “national doldrums” and “malaise” dominating the society at large.  This 
resulted from “the actual structural separation of people from power, from relevant 
knowledge, from pinnacles of decision-making.”  The document proposed, “But the civil 
rights, peace, and student movements are too poor and socially sighted, and the labor 
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movement too quiescent, to be counted with enthusiasm.  From where else can power and 
vision be summoned?  We believe that the universities are an overlooked seat of influence.”
23
 
The Port Huron Statement was remarkably direct in its assault on the labor 
movement, when SDS was still the student organization of the LID.  The document went so 
far as to equate labor with its traditional opponent: “To the average American, […] big labor 
is a growing cancer equal in impact to Big Business – nothing could be more distorted, even 
granting a sizable union bureaucracy.”
 24
  The students saw the labor movement as self-
interested and no longer radical, having submitted to institutionalization, its idealism fading 
as labor itself becomes a business.  This institutionalization resulted in “labor-leader 
elitism”—“Even the House of Labor has bay windows”—as well as “rank-and-file apathy to 
the tradition of unionism,” resulting in overall “accommodation and limited effectiveness by 
the labor movement.”
25
  SDS thus set the student movement up to accept the mantle of 
progressive democratic liberalism which labor had let fall. 
The LID was adamantly against The Port Huron Statement because of the document’s 
treatment of labor issues and “anti-anti-Communism.”  The LID embraced “Cold Warrior” 
brand liberalism and demanded a hard line approach to anti-Communism from its student 
wing; however, the young activists were disinclined to exclude the participation of 
communists from the organization, although they in no way suggested SDS espoused 
communist ideology.
26
  As historian James Miller stated, “At some point, though, the debate 
had ceased to be about principles, and had become instead a struggle over the autonomy of 
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  The accusations of The Port Huron Statement regarding the labor 
movement alarmed and angered many members of what was now becoming the “Old” Left, 
including Michael Harrington, who conceived of himself as a bridge from the Old Left to the 
New. 
 
THE “OLD” LEFT 
 The creation of a New Left implied that it replaced a pre-existing Left, which 
therefore was re-christened as Old.  It also implied a difference in position.  Much of the 
New Left was, upon closer examination, quite “Old.”  Their critique of the university system 
characterized the New-ness of the sixties student movement most remarkably, where “‘The 
University’ came to be regarded as part of the Establishment, and as the point of immediate 
contact, the most oppressive part.”
28
  In the 1966 article “Origins of the Movement,” labor 
journalist Paul Jacobs and New Left member Saul Landau discussed the relationship between 
the student movements of the previous decades.  They wrote that although many within the 
New Left had “parents who had been the radicals and left liberals of the thirties and the 
forties […] this new group of young activists knew little about the debates of the thirties. […] 
Outside the classroom they referred with a sneer to the ‘old days’—the thirties, forties, and 
now the fifties.  Like the rest of American society, the old left, they believed, had in some 
way ‘betrayed’ them: they had ‘sold out’ or else were ‘hung up’ on old and dead battles.”
 29
  
The authors elaborate on the generation gap: “They had learned a new set of ideals from their 
parents and now, much to their parents’ discomfiture, they were trying to put those ideals 
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  The article has an overriding tone of condescension in its emphasis on 
rejecting the old, and frequent use of the words “they” and “them” imply a conflicting “us.” 
Michael Harrington sustained a relationship with SDS throughout the better part of 
the sixties.  In 1962, at the birth of The Port Huron Statement, Harrington was in his early 
thirties, a member of both the LID, and an elder statesman the Young People’s Socialist 
Party (YPSL).  Harrington actually planned a YPSL takeover of SDS in the very early 
sixties.  It is a testament to the appeal of SDS ideology that they maintained control of the 
organization.
31
  (Ironically, the Marxist-Leninist Progressive Labor Party took the name SDS 
in 1969.)  Harrington and Donald Slaiman of the AFL-CIO attended the Port Huron 
discussion on behalf of the interests of the League for Industrial Democracy. 
Harrington personally agreed with the idea of participatory democracy, but not with 
the document’s criticisms of the labor movement, anti-communism, and of “older radicals.”  
The latter criticism felt like a personal attack for Harrington, who had been a mentor to SDS; 
he spoke at the 1960 Conference on Human Rights, one of the first major SDS events.  
Hayden, the author of the document, affirmed that the attack on “older radicals” had a 
personal bent.  SDS was trying to create a movement of students, and therefore Harrington 
represented “the perfect guy for everybody to overthrow.”  When SDS did not implement the 
suggestions that Harrington made, he informed the LID of SDS’s refusal.  Harrington later 
summarized the experience of Port Huron: “Here I was: I was thirty-four.  I’d been a youth 
leader for so long that people were joking that I was ‘the oldest young socialist in America.’  
[…] Up comes this younger generation.  I think that they are ignoring my honest, sincere and 
absolutely profound advice.  And this struck at my self-image.  I think that part of my 
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The debate between SDS and the LID over The Port Huron Statement solidified the 
growing distinction between Old and New Left.  In 1959, Harrington had declared: “A major 
political change is beginning in the United States, and if it continues to develop it will 
reshape American politics.  It will result in a New Left.”
33
  A decade later, Harrington 
summed up his feelings about the New Left in the essay “The Mystical Militants”: “I have 
differences with the young radicals and have on occasion been puzzled, exasperated, and 
even saddened by them.  Yet the happy fact remains that the emergence of a personally 
committed generation seeking basic social change is momentous.  They are a minority of 
their age group, to be sure, but a creative, activist minority who should place their stamp 
upon the times.”
34
  Despite the disagreement at Port Huron, Harrington remained connected 
to SDS over the course of the 1960s. 
Another member of the Old Left, Walter P. Reuther of the United Auto Workers, 
supported SDS and sought connections between his organization and the student movement.  
An article critical of the labor movement as a “one-party state” after the “days of vigorous 
union faction and a democratic internal life ended in the forties,” it conceded, “The United 
Auto Workers, however, is generally believed to be the most democratic and progressive of 
the large American unions.”
35
  Reuther participated in the SLID at Detroit City College, and 
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he remained an important patron of the LID.  Reuther followed the emerging student 
movement with great interest.  The UAW leadership, writes labor historian John Barnard, 
“originally saw the New Left, along with the mobilized masses of the civil rights movement, 
as an integral part of a new progressive reform coalition and welcomed its advent.”
36
  SDS 
took pride in Reuther's support, and a number of SDS pamphlets proclaim: “The SDS 
program is supported by prominent Americans.  Walter Reuther has said of SDS, ‘it is in the 
vanguard of student organizations dedicated to the forces of progress in America.’”
37
  Several 
members of the Ann Arbor core of SDS came from UAW families, including Barry 
Bluestone and ERAP leader Sharon Jeffrey, and as Lichtenstein wrote: “The UAW 




Barnard also observes that The Port Huron Statement paraphrased many UAW goals, 
and that Reuther actually shared some of the students’ criticisms regarding the labor 
movement’s accused “quiescence.”  Barnard writes, “By the end of the 1950s, UAW leaders, 
like many observers within and outside the labor movement, were concerned about the 
ebbing vigor and commitment of labor.  The movement, including the UAW, needed an 
infusion of youthful idealism, something akin to the energy, vision, and determination the 
Reuther brothers and so many other had brought to the autoworker organizing in the 
1930s.”
39
  Reuther and SDS therefore had similar hopes for the potential of the growing 
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student movement and its relation to the labor unions.  Although SDS supported strikes and 
worked with unions, including the UAW, on specific projects, a consistent and organized 
alliance between SDS and even progressive unions such as the UAW never materialized. 
 
THE NEW LEFT: THE NATURAL ALLIANCE OF THE LABOR AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
MOVEMENTS? 
The president of SDS in 1967, Nick Egleson, explained the stimulating effect of the 
Southern Civil Rights Movement on the development of a national campus protest movement 
in an article in the SDS publication New Left Notes.  Egleson wrote, “The idea, the possibility 
of protests in the south as well as the experience of it, was an important part of sparking 
campus protests.  Dissent in one place created the possibility for dissent elsewhere, and 
dissent materialized on the campus.”
40
  SDS constantly acknowledged and celebrated the 
inspiration it found in the Civil Rights Movement, particularly the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC).  Several SDS members had spent time working with 
SNCC in the South, and SDS as an organization borrowed much of their structure from 
SNCC.  The relationship between SDS and SNCC was only one facet of the student 
movement’s role in the Civil Rights Movement, which SDS perceived as a way to connect 
the different divisions of liberalism, especially labor.  A typed sheet of preparatory materials 
for a 1960 SDS newsletter included a report on a national AFL-CIO boycott of Sears and 
Roebuck in response to Sears’ attempt to undermine the clerks union.  The report mentions 
Sears’ discriminatory practices at its lunch counters as well, hoping that “Here is a focus that 
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may well bring to the fore the natural alliance of the labor and civil rights movements.”
41
 
SDS literature of the early sixties frequently mentioned the phrase “the natural alliance of the 
labor and civil rights movements,” an important indication of the direction of the emerging 
student movement hoped to move. 
SDS leader Alan Haber articulated this “natural alliance” in a detailed note that 
reflected on a meeting with Donald Slaiman and Boris Schiskin of the League for Industrial 
Democracy.
42
  Haber mentioned that the ALF-CIO donated $5,000 to a recent SNCC 
conference in Atlanta, but there was no one present “to give any indication of labors interest 
in the sit-in movement” or to explore labor organizing in the union-deficient South.  Haber 
suggested that SDS could serve as a mediator, “pointing out the importance, significance 
radica[l] [student] action can have for the labor” movement.  SDS “are the one student org 
that is close to labor,” and thus “feel particularly responsible to keep it informed on 
development on the student [scene].”  Haber suggested that SDS emphasize to labor that the 
radical potential offered by the sit-ins, the link between civil rights and “questions of the 
Negroes economic position,” which made the “natural allia[n]ce [between] the civil rights 
and labor movements” apparent.
43
  Haber recognized the labor movement’s failure to seize 
the opportunity for organization in the South offered by the student-led sit-in movement, as 
well as the Southern students’ “ignorance” about the labor movement in general.  Haber 
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skirted the historic relationship between Southern blacks and the labor movement, as he 
suggested “the issues of jim crow unions is not central here and should not be allowed to 
become the issue of discussion,” although “this will take some diplomacy.”
44
  Haber also 
tried to circumvent the relationship with mainstream liberalism.  He suggested that “political 
alignment should not become an issue,” as “Labor has its eggs in the democratic basket” and 
the Civil Rights Movement was still trying to gain a solid political ally.
45
  Haber recognized 
that SDS must overlook any compromise in organized labor’s political decision in the 
interest of the student movement’s need for a certain level of mainstream legitimacy. 
The Civil Rights Movement remained a leading inspiration for the New Left over the 
course of the decade.  SDS ideology often followed the southern student movement: it was 
when SNCC began to turn towards the militancy of Black Power and the Black Panther Party 
that SDS also become more militant.  With Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Southern Christian 
Leadership Council (SCLC), the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), 
organized in April 1960, defined the Civil Rights Movement of the late fifties and the sixties.  
One article, “Origins of the Movement,” emphasized the moral appeal of SNCC’s 
organization on the emerging New Left: “SNCC wasn’t political; it was concerned with right 
and wrong, with people.  The SNCC ideal of morality in action also provided the spur for the 
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and its community and campus programs.”
46
  The 
Civil Rights Movement was perhaps the most significant inspiration for SDS, and in that 
context the development of SNCC is particularly significant because it was a radical student 
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organization.  From the beginning, SNCC shared close ties to SDS, although the two 
organizations never established an official alliance.  Many members of SDS worked on the 
Freedom Ride program in the South in the early sixties.  SDS organized first and pioneered 
New Left ideology and involvement in Cold War issues, but SNCC inspired and led a 
significant amount of SDS thinking.  For many of those who would become New Leftists, 
groups like the NAACP, CORE, and even the SCLC represented a middle-class, mainstream 
liberalism that had thus far failed to enact real reform.  SNCC excited and inspired campus 
activists because—while its membership was still largely middle class—it employed direct 
action. 
 
STUDENTS AND LABOR 
 In his 1969 article, “Notes on a Decade Ready for the Dustbin,” former SDS leader 
Carl Oglesby posed the question, “Behind how many of these so-called ‘bourgeois’ children, 
one or two generations back, stands a father in a blue collar, a mother in an apron?”  Oglesby 
side-stepped class and connected the Old and the New Left racially: “The revolutionary 
aspiration of whites in the 1930’s manifested itself most sharply in factory struggles.  In the 
1960’s, that aspiration has materialized most sharply on the campuses.”
47
  Although Oglesby 
suggested that the “revolutionary aspiration of whites” was no longer present in the factories, 
students of the New Left consistently sought, or at the very least paid lip-service to their 
desire for, an alliance with the sixties’ labor movement.  Only months after the drafting of the 
student’s criticisms of labor in The Port Huron Statement in 1962, Alan Haber issued a 
substantial paper assessing Students and Labor, which proposed, “It is well past time for a 
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reappraisal of the relationship between labor and the student.” Haber dissected the reasons 
why the growing student movement would be separated from the labor movement, and 
proposed points of commonality.  He viewed the coalition of students and labor to be integral 
to the building of an effective New Left: “If the university is to provide an institutional base 
for the liberal movement, however, its resources must be systematically evaluated and 
rationally connected to the other progressive forces operating in the country.”  Haber 
observed that, “labor today is the most liberal of the main stream institutions,” yet “it is 
shunned or treated as at best a distant ally by the major part of the student political 
community.”  Haber bemoaned labor for its “lack of interest” in college students and the 
issues of the university.
48
 
Tom Kahn, executive secretary of the LID, attributed the student-labor separation to 
middle-class insularity in a 1966 article “On the Problem of the New Left.”  Kahn dated the 
split to the dissatisfaction of fifties intellectuals with labor, which made it “predictable” that 
the next generation of radicals “would view labor as simply another big institution—and the 
New Left is very much a revolt against bigness.”  Kahn argued that the social-political 
climate of the Cold War directly resulted in the separation of labor and liberalism: “But it is 
important to remember that the indifference or hostility to labor grew out of a conservative 
period, when middle-class prosperity was reshaping the ethos of the university, and the 
McClelland hearings were convincing millions of Americans that Dave Beck of the 
Teamsters was the prototype of the labor leader.”  Kahn continued: “Thus, while much 
student criticism of labor comes from the Left, it also contains strands of middle-class 
prejudice—a lack of appreciation for, or identification with, the historic and continuing role 
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of the unions in the day-to-day lives of literally millions of working people.”
49
  He therefore 
attributes the student’s disconnect with the labor movement to a class conflict, without 
crediting the unions for any divisiveness. 
 On the other hand, Haber’s paper acknowledged the obstacles blocking this allied 
movement for students and labor.  Self-image was identified as an important issue for the 
student: “The student has a professional orientation whereas labor remains identified with the 
‘working class’ and the wage system.  The student does not see himself as a potential union 
member.”  College students come out of an upper or middle-class background, preventing 
identification with the labor movement and resulting in a value of individual over collective 
action.  Furthermore, their middle-class education “underplayed or criticized [the labor 
movement] as a progressive force in American development.”  To the student radical, labor’s 
record seemed ineffective and in areas like civil rights labor even stood out as a counter-force 
to the student movement’s interests.  There were obstacles for the unions as well.  The labor 
movement was on the defensive in the postwar economy, which was automated and defense-
driven, and industry was declining in the face of increased competition and legislation.  The 
situation spoke to the common need of students and labor to organize white-collar workers 
and to move away from a war economy.  Although the labor unionist might feel little 
connection with the college student, “with the mounting crisis in financing higher education, 




Kahn pointed out the traditional and consistent role of the labor movement in liberal 
politics.  He claimed, “The single new ideological feature of the ‘New Left’—all that seems 
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to me really new about it—is the rejection, implicit or explicit, of this fundamental 
assumption.”  He speculated that the students middle-class biases diminished their perception 
of the radical potential of the working class: “The reasoning behind this rejection is not that 
the labor leadership or bureaucracy represses the workers’ instinctive radicalism or that the 
workers have been atomized or culturally degraded by mass society (the ex-radical’s 
formula), but that the organized working class has achieved its goals and has itself 
consequently become part of the power structure.”
51
 
In Students and Labor, Haber presented a more nuanced and balanced assessment of 
the relationship between the labor movement and the “power structure.”  He asserted that one 
of the primary obstacles for a worker-student alliance was the impression that although the 
labor movement was forged as an opposition group, that by 1962: 
It appears not as an opposition group but as a reform club within the 
“establishment.”  It does not call for militant rank and file action, it does not 
basically challenge the structure of the Democratic Party, it doesn’t challenge 
the economic privilege of corporate elites.  Even more disheartening to 
students, its failure to banish discrimination from within its own house makes 
it a party to the racism that pervades almost every institution of American life.  
And after surrendering the possibility of independent social power in favor of 
the more respectable role of lobby and critic, it appears to acquiesce as well 





The students were less inclined to work within the system, and instead hoped to challenge the 
problems they saw with the established political institutions in order “to impose democratic 
principle on the distribution of power and privilege.”
53
  Because of labor’s 
institutionalization, they accused the labor movement of a “failure of vision.”  Haber wrote, 
“if labor is to come off the economic defensive, it must go on the political offensive. […] 
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labor must begin to construct a movement adequate to the prob[lems] and obstacles of the 
1960’s—in this it can build an alliance with students and the university.”
54
  Haber argued 
clearly that students and labor had symbiotic potential.  For example, students represented a 
potential influx of much-needed leadership for the labor movement; traditionally, student 
radicals would graduate into union organization, but this progression had faded.  
Furthermore, students and labor had a shared interest in the pertinent need to organize the 
white-collar workforce; many students were likely to enter administrative jobs after 
graduation, and the changing economy meant that white-collar workers would be an integral 
addition if the labor movement were to remain relevant. 
Perhaps most importantly for SDS, the labor movement had the most potential to 
provide the necessary “social base of support” which the student movement lacked.  Haber 
wrote that the movement on campus “is without financial resources or a backlog of 
organizational experience and desperately needs a working connection with the mainstream 
of liberal political activity.  The labor movement has the facilities and certainly the 
experience that can be decisive in the building of an allied movement in the universities.”
55
  
Haber placed the burden of coalescence on his peers: “if an alliance is going to develop, 
students will have to do more than show their own passive willingness.  They will have to 
convince labor that it is necessary.”  An alliance of students and labor is “not merely a matter 
of convenience; it is a matter of mutual survival.”
56
  It seemed, as Kahn wrote, “If not the 
labor movement, then what social force can be expected to lead the way in transforming 
society, and how are the students to relate to that force?”
57
  Haber argued that although 
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students might see labor as merely a “cog” in the machine of Big Government, any 
compromise of labor union power represented a failure of the entire liberal community.
58
 
Both Kahn and Haber failed to address in their assessment of students and labor the 
possible connection in young factory workers.  Although America and the New Era, the sort 
of sequel to The Port Huron Statement that defined the ideology behind ERAP and 
enumerated the “Triple Revolution,” criticized the failure of the labor movement to organize 
the increasing ranks of the young unemployed and the growing white-collar workforce, but 
makes no mention of young workers.
59
  By 1969, one third of union members were under the 
age of thirty.
60
 Brendan Sexton in a 1969 essay pointed out: 
Young workers outnumber all college students, and there are perhaps fifteen 
or twenty of them for every one disaffected youth upon whom various 
advocates of a New Politics are counting.  The big three in auto alone employ 
about 250,000 workers who are thirty or under.  Total UAW membership of 





He continued, arguing for the political potential of the young workers: “Young workers seem 
to be tougher and to have more staying power than students. Their stake in social change may 
turn out to be greater and more compelling.  Most will never experience the softening effect 
of well-paid, high-status jobs in the professional, academic, artistic, or business worlds—jobs 
to which most student rebels are on their way.”
62
  They often wrote about the political 
potential of the traditional labor movement, but SDS never concentrated on the growing base 
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of the young working class.  Doing so might have allowed the students to avoid the common 
perception of the working class as the “Old” Left.  Furthermore, it might have been easier for 
the students to identify with young workers without fear of racism and paternalism.  As the 
contemporary young worker pointed out, “Knowing they’re unlikely to escape individually, 





Alan Haber speculated in a later interview whether the controversy surrounding The 
Port Huron Statement produced latent antagonism that permanently wounded the relationship 
between SDS and LID: 
We shouldn’t have been put under siege.  The LID could have had a more 
generous attitude towards their offspring.  Just as we were riding the crest of 
our new strength and making political connections in Washington, we were 
pulled up short.  And it’s hard to tell whether that was fortuitous in really 
galvanizing the organization that took shape at Port Huron, or whether it 
really turned us around in some negative way that didn’t become apparent 




Following Port Huron, the groups amicably coexisted for the next few years.  SDS broached 
the topic of separation sporadically; in a 1963 Key List
65
 mailing, SDS acknowledged, “It is 
no secret to most of you that there have been problems in the relationship between SDS and 
LID, especially since last summer [Port Huron].  The situation has been made difficult by the 
lack of trust—whether justified or not is not the issue—on the part of both.  Yet at the present 
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we must live together, and things are progressing slowly, if at all.”  The note suggested, 
“either we move toward a sharing of work and purposes and program, or we must move 
towards separation.”
66
  Over the next few years, the alarming growth of SDS conjoined with 
the escalation of the Vietnam War and the corresponding protest movement challenged the 
relationship between SDS and the LID.  Students for a Democratic Society separated from 
the League for Industrial Democracy in 1965, after years of discussion about the relationship 
between the runaway student organization and its parent.  The separation was directly 
stimulated by a couple of incidents: Arthur McDowell’s accusations of Communist activity 
and “sophomoric Leninist slick talk,”
 67
 and SDS’s failure to adhere to regulations ensuring 
the LID remain tax-exempt.  Partisan political activism would revoke the LID’s tax-exempt 
status. 
 The ubiquitous Michael Harrington, in his new role as Chairman of the Board with 
LID, wrote a memorandum in July 1965 defending SDS against McDowell’s accusations.  
McDowell, a member of the Council Against Communist Aggression, had suggested to the 
LID Board that they resign because: “The Communist apparatus has swung behind your 
Students for a Democratic Society and pulled out all the stops of machinery and resources it 
had been holding in reserve and under cover for years.”
 68
  In his note, Harrington clarified 
the position of the LID towards SDS in light of the accusations.  Harrington supported SDS, 
although he acknowledged the presence of unrelated tension: “I do not want to imply that 
there are no problems between the LID and SDS.  There are (as indicated in the enclosed 
resolution of the LID Board).  But they certainly do not come about because our youth 
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affiliate is pro-Communist or infiltrated by Communists.  And I can think of no way to 
accentuate the dangerous generational schism which does exist in the liberal and radical 
movements today than by resorting to Mr. McDowell’s McCarthyite methods.”  Harrington 




 The incident allowed Harrington to address real issues regarding the relationship 
between LID and SDS, which was increasingly difficult, although not hostile.  Harrington 
admitted, “We face, rather, young people who genuinely and honestly and openly disagree 
with us.”  He proposed that the LID seek to engage a dialogue with the younger activists, and 
conceded that, “For our part, the LID will have to learn to live with an irreverent youth 
organization which will take stands that may well sadden, and even anger, us.”  Harrington 
argued that those stands were sincere, despite any disagreement with the LID platform, and 
because SDS ideology was not in fact a result of infiltration, “we owe it to the youth to adopt 
such an attitude.”
70
  Although Harrington seemed to value organizational association with 
SDS, the traditional New/Old Left tension is evident.  The word “irreverent” suggests a lack 
of respect; the older activists wanted their younger associates to abide by their rules, but they 
recognized and conceded to the impatience of SDS.  Harrington attempted to negate these 
paternalistic connotations, writing: “In saying these things, I am not proposing that we 
‘tolerate’ the young people.  That is an arrogant way of looking at the matter.  Rather, I 
believe that the SDS is, for all of our problems with it, a potentially hopeful and positive 
development on the American scene.  It represents personal commitment and political 
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  However, this statement did not validate the ideological and intellectual 
credibility of SDS, merely its vigor.  It remained condescending. 
Harrington sought to maintain the coalition with SDS in the interest of a “revitalized 
LID” which would “function as a meeting place of the two generations of the American 
democratic Left, a center where there can be candid, open discussion on all sides.”
72
  Tom 
Kahn, serving as Executive Secretary of the LID, also mentioned his organization’s self-
appointed role as student-liberal-labor liaison: “the League finds itself the chief 
organizational link between the new student movement and the liberal-labor community.”  
Furthermore, Kahn also took a paternalistic approach to the LID’s relationship with their 
young associates, for whom the League accepted the “opportunities and burdens of 
attempting to educate the students and to influence their activities in a healthy direction.”  
Kahn continued, “We consider this responsibility a challenging aspect of the League’s work.  
If we are able to discharge it effectively we will have made an important contribution to the 
future of the liberal movement in America.”
73
 The LID passed a resolution at the June 1965 
Board of Directors Meetings which put “on record the League’s dissatisfaction” with the new 
amendment to the SDS constitution which “removed the reference to Communism as an 
authoritarian movement.”
74
  Tom Kahn wrote to the AFL-CIO’s Donald Slaiman that 
tensions had arisen because of particular currents within SDS, including “hostility toward the 
labor movement,” which represented the “ideological confusion” of SDS.  Kahn emphasized 
that there was no Communist infiltration or pro-Communism present in SDS, and that “the 
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negative tendencies in the new student movement are not irreversible.”  He deemed it in the 
best interest of the LID to remain involved with the student movement.
75
  
The LID tried to find a way to integrate the rebellious younger organization.  When 
SDS leader Todd Gitlin complained that it was not made clear on the agenda that SDS would 
be the main topic of discussion at the Board of Directors’ meeting, Kahn pointed out the 
unanimous passage of the “resolution committing the League to wider and stronger contact 
with SDS.  This is our policy; I am personally committed to it.”
76
  Kahn followed this 
assertion by blaming SDS for the tension:  “I am also aware that there are those within SDS 
who have decided that a split with the LID is inevitable and desirable.  They are encouraged 
by others on the periphery of SDS who spend a great deal of energy attacking the LID and 
individual Board members as enemies and sell-outs.”
77
  However, SDS was unwilling to 
compromise their politics in the interest of the LID tax exemption.  It was in the best interest 
of each group for the LID and SDS to divorce.  The split corresponded with the escalation of 
the Vietnam War and a corresponding increased emphasis in SDS on draft resistance.  The 
LID and SDS announced their separation on October 4, 1965, to take effect beginning in 
January of the upcoming year.  The LID Annual Report of the Executive Director stated: “It 
simply happened that the conflict over the tax issue, where legal restrictions left little room 
for policy alternatives, came to a head before the political issue did.”
78
 
 In “How New Was the New Left?,” Andrew Hunt argues that the sixties Left goes 
beyond a simple Old/New dichotomy, and in fact there was much more give and take 
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between the two.  In the late years of the decade, further division resulted in the second 
generation of SDS pushing itself out of the New Left and actually falling back on what had 
been determined as Old Left sources and ideologies.  Hunt writes, “At their best, the 1960s 
insurgents furnished a moral appeal to action that still resonates today.  They were the first 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE WAR ON POVERTY AND 
THE NEW INSURGENCY 
 
 
Historically, one of the dangers for the American ruling class involved in the use of 
democratic rhetoric is that the ruled sometimes decide to take that rhetoric seriously. 





 On May 22, 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson addressed the graduating class of the 
University of Michigan.  He challenged the students: “For in your time, we have the 
opportunity not only to move to the rich society, and the powerful society, but upward to the 
Great Society.  The Great Society rests on abundance and liberty for all.  It demands an end 
to poverty, and racial injustice, to which we are totally committed in our time.” Earlier that 
year, President Johnson had announced the undertaking of a national War on Poverty.  
Speaking to the graduates in May, he said: 
Within your lifetime powerful forces already loosed will take us toward a way 
of life beyond the realm of our experience, almost beyond the bounds of our 
imagination.  For better or for worse, your generation has been appointed by 
history to deal with those problems, and to lead America toward a new age.  
You have the chance never before afforded to any people in any age: you can 
help build a society where the demands of morality and the needs of the spirit 




Students for a Democratic Society, the organization that had emerged from a group at the 
University of Michigan, had declared their willingness to take that lead two years before in 
The Port Huron Statement.  Now, the War on Poverty program allowed SDS the opportunity 
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to take advantage of mainstream legitimacy for their newly proposed central program—the 
political mobilization of the poor community. 
 Two months prior to his speech in Ann Arbor, President Johnson addressed the 
United Auto Workers’ Convention in Detroit.  He commended Walter Reuther and the UAW 
as a leading example for the labor movement of “a clean, and honest, and progressive union.”  
In this speech, too, he emphasized the administrative War on Poverty: “Our times have been 
dominated by a Cold War; but now our times require that here at home we assume a warm-
hearted war, a war of compassion for the well-being of all of our people here at home.  […] 
We have declared war on poverty.  As long as I head this administration—and I believe as 
long as Walter Reuther heads the Auto Workers—the terms of this war on poverty are 
unconditional surrender.”  Johnson read a portion from a wire he had received from the 
UAW president, pledging, “On behalf of the officers and one and one half members of the 
UAW, I am pleased to advise you that in answer to your call we enlist with you for the 
duration of the war against poverty.”  Johnson assured the union that this war was, “above 
all, a fight for opportunity. Not a hand out, not a dole, but a vast upgrading of our people’s 
skills.”
3
  The union responded by creating the Citizens’ Crusade Against Poverty to act as a 
component of the larger national effort. 
In 1962, The Port Huron Statement declared, “Personal links between man and man 
are needed, especially to go beyond the partial and fragmentary bonds of function that bind 
men only as worker to worker, employee to employee, teacher to student, American to 
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  With the Economic Research and Action Project, conceived in 1963 and 
instituted in 1964, SDS attempted to create personal links between the students and the 
people they tried to organize, as well as links between the various factions of what they 
hoped would become a powerful left-wing coalition of the labor, civil rights, and 
student/peace movements.  ERAP envisioned these groups coalescing based on shared 
economic interests.  The project was a deliberate attempt to bring the Southern Civil Rights 
Movement to the North, as well as to provide a provocative grassroots component to the 
liberal War on Poverty.  Embodying the ideals of participatory democracy and transgressing 
traditional boundaries, the students involved in ERAP lived in the communities they were 
organizing, some for only a summer and others for years. The purpose of ERAP was to 
mobilize an “interracial movement of the poor.” 
Although SDS had organized previous national projects—such as the Peace Research 
and Education Project (PREP), newsletters, and numerous student conferences—ERAP was a 
significant shift for SDS because of one crucial word: action.  Until this point SDS was 
principally an intellectual movement.  This dominance changed when in ERAP’s attempt to 
mobilize the poor, SDS also mobilized students, as they learned about community organizing 
in the ghettoes of nine American cities.  The project tested the utopian vision of participatory 
democracy set forth in The Port Huron Statement, and SDS based ERAP on the principles 
and ideology presented in America and the New Era, an SDS working document written by 
Tom Hayden and Richard Flacks in 1963.  In the paper, SDS argued for a return to the 
populism and progressivism that mainstream liberalism had abandoned: “the organization of 
disenfranchised groups for the effective exercise of their political power—in short, the 
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recapturing of the populist inheritance of liberalism—these […] are the only conceivable 
ways by which liberal programs could be enacted.”
5
 
In its announcement of ERAP, SDS claimed, “Our critique of American society is not 
simply that it fails to meet the needs of its people, but that its institutions are not structured to 
allow popular control.”
6
  Through ERAP, the students attempted to put city institutions and 
the anti-poverty apparatus into the democratic control of the poor population and to directly 
confront the established structure of city politics.  An introductory pamphlet to ERAP asked, 
“Can local organizations and protest movements move toward the achievement of a grass-
roots political coalition capable of challenging the established power structure of the city?”
7
  
The project attempted to create this coalition out of the poor population itself, allied with the 
Civil Rights Movement, labor unions, and the student radicals.  SDS felt that the labor 
movement had failed to reach the unemployed and working poor, and took the challenge to 
mobilize the population in the stead of union organizers.  The ERAP organizers saw poverty 
as a way to build a movement across racial boundaries.  The same pamphlet demonstrated the 
new movement’s goal to connect economic grievances with racism, which made both 
poverty and discrimination social instead of personal problems: 
[T]he façade of American prosperity hides a reality of depressed areas, sick 
industries, agricultural waste, planned obsolescence and unneeded products.  
The long standing problems of planless production, maldistribution and 
minority rule in the economy are brought to crisis proportions by automation. 
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This economic crisis is compounded by a moral crisis: racism becomes 
inherent in an economy that cannot provide jobs for the unskilled and does not 




The founding philosophy behind ERAP contended that economic grievance would connect 
the poor population across grave racial barriers, and that the common need for “jobs or 
income” created a “natural alliance” among all poor.  The students set out to organize “those 
Americans who are now denied the opportunity to participate fully in the country’s economic 
and political life.  We advocate a democratic transformation of American political, social and 
economic life.”
9
  Furthermore, the organizers intended to connect the civil rights, peace, and 
labor movements under a common cause.  In the earliest days of the project, this ambitious 
coalition seemed possible because of the financial support of the labor movement. 
 
THE CITIZENS’ CRUSADE AGAINST POVERTY 
The Students for a Democratic Society conceived the Economic Research and Action 
Project in 1963, immediately after the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom.  SDS 
envisioned the American poor as the new vanguard of liberalism and democracy, a ripe 
population in need only of organizational guidance.  As ERAP student Richie Rothstein later 
wrote, the students imagined the project with “the clear notion of how indigenous democratic 
organizations of the poor and the unemployed would contribute to major social change in 
American and the world.”
10
  The unlikely combination of middle-class students and urban 
poor would therefore lead liberalism into a new democratic American revolution.  The SDS 
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program preceded anti-poverty efforts by the labor movement and mainstream liberalism, 
reflecting the inspiration of the Civil Rights Movement. 
However, the enlistment of the labor movement in the fight against poverty offered 
specific material advantages for the student movement.  The United Auto Workers Reuther 
unveiled the “Crusade Against Poverty” at their 1964 National Convention in Atlantic City, 
New Jersey.  The UAW Citizens’ Crusade Against Poverty (CCAP) took a legislative 
approach to the national anti-poverty program, propelled by a budget of $1.1 million.  The 
leadership of Students for a Democratic Society attended the UAW Convention at Reuther’s 
invitation.
11
  Despite criticizing the top-down approach of the Crusade program, SDS 
recognized an opportunity to gain a mainstream ally for the newly conceived and chronically 
under-funded ERAP. 
Michigan student Rennie Davis, who would later serve as ERAP president, reported 
on the Convention for the inaugural July 1964 ERAP Project Report.  Davis noted that 
Reuther had sent hundreds of letters to different factions of the political left—women’s 
groups, civil rights groups, churches, businesses, unions, etc.—seeking support for the UAW 
campaign.  While endorsing the common cause, Davis criticized the Crusade Against 
Poverty, concerned that the UAW program would carry “education and service into the 
ghetto at the expense of radical politics,” and that CCAP “considers the major significant 
[attacks] on poverty to be found on the legislative front, relying essentially on the ways of the 
liberal coalition of the last 30 years rather than the less certain road of building a new 
coalition with organized Negroes and poor whites as a critical new element.”
12
  Therefore, 
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ERAP would fill the role of organizing an interracial “critical new element” to liberal anti-
poverty programs—with CCAP’s blessing.  Davis also speculated that the student project 
might meet hostility from UAW locals or community churches that might deviate from their 
respective leadership.  Davis saw this rank-and-file defection as a reflection of the problems 
of a top-down approach to creating a coalition, as opposed to a “genuine movement of the 
poor.”
13
   
The federal administration’s Community Action Program (CAP) promoted the idea of 
trade union-style local organizations to foster political participation in poor communities, and 
served as the organizational and ideological underpinnings of Johnson’s War on Poverty 
agenda.  Labor historian Nelson Lichtenstein wrote, “The Community Action Program 
(CAP) was by far the most radical innovation in the antipoverty program, for it was premised 
upon the idea that poverty is rooted as much in the political powerlessness of the poor as it is 
in their lack of jobs, education, or motivation.”
14
  Although the concept for ERAP preceded 
Johnson’s announcement of a War on Poverty and the accompanying establishment of the 
creation of the federal CAP and the UAW’s CCAP, these institutions provided mainstream 
legitimacy for SDS’s organizing program. 
The students originally envisioned ERAP as a way to bring the student radicals and 
the labor unions together in organizing.  One ERAP pamphlet claimed, “Ultimately 
organizations with established industrial and trade unions must work together as an 
alternative to corporate control.”  The pamphlet explicitly listed one purpose of ERAP, to 
“create a working alliance between student radicals and progressive labor unions.”
15
  The 
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students hoped that unemployment would be a viable issue to connect the poor population 
with the established political power of the labor unions.  SDS would try to establish “student-
labor coordinating committees in every campus area” to work together for education, action 
and organization, and white-collar unionism—in that order.  An entire section entitled 
“ERAP and the Labor Movement” explained, 
ERAP believes that the once strong alliance between radicals and progressive 
unionists must and can be rebuilt.  We seek to develop cooperative action in 
areas of local organizing, civil rights, peace economics and insurgent politics.  
In the context of such action we hope that university based radicals can be 
both a spur to union militance and a stimulant to debate on issues of full 





Despite their criticism of the mainstream liberal approach to anti-poverty work, at this point 
SDS was still willing, even trying, to work within established political avenues.  In fact, the 
ERAP relied on CCAP and the liberal War on Poverty in order to survive.  The ERAP 
program worked in parallel to CCAP and the War on Poverty, not against it.  A 1966 CCAP 
Bulletin urged, “College students of good will to drop whatever they are doing” to help Cesar 
Chavez in the San Joaquin Valley.
17
  Reuther supported ERAP, and he “authorized a series of 
student internships in Detroit and Washington, put SDS President Todd Gitlin on the CCAP 
steering committee, and urged UAW locals across the county to cooperate with SDS 
organizing projects.  On occasion Reuther turned down an SDS funding request, but only 
because he mistakenly thought too much money was earmarked for ‘education’ and not 
enough for ‘organizing.’ […] Reuther was not to be outflanked on the left.”
18
  CCAP even 
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hired SNCC leader Stokely Carmichael to spend the summer of 1967 in Washington, DC to 
work as a field organizer.
19
 
As Richie Rothstein later wrote, at the outset of ERAP, “SDS still believed in the 
possibility of change within the framework of the formally representative institutions of 
American government.  ERAP’s goal was to goose those institutions a bit; to set up currents 
in American political life which would reverse the corruption of established liberal and trade-
union forces.”
20
  Thus, a coalition of labor unions and the poor, stimulated by the student 
radicals, could have a purifying effect on institutional liberalism, which The Port Huron 
Statement had called “acquiescent.”  This return to the roots—radicalism, progressivism, and 
even democracy itself in its truest form—would in turn invigorate the civil rights and the 
peace movements, and the liberal and labor “forces, with pressure and inspiration from 
ERAP and other ‘new insurgencies’, would demand that resources be transferred from the 
cold war arms race to the creation of a decentralized, democratic, inter-racial welfare state at 
home.”
21
  SDS therefore envisioned ERAP as a potential galvanizing vehicle for the dormant 
rank-and-file labor movement. 
The founding document for the philosophy behind ERAP, Carl Wittman and Thomas 
Hayden’s America and the New Era, blamed the unions retreat from populism and descent 
into managerialism for the overall apathy and inaction of American politics: “Organized 
liberalism, however, must take at least part of the credit for America’s political stalemate.  A 
style of politics which emphasizes cocktail parties and seminars rather than protest marches, 
local reform movements, and independent bases of power cannot achieve leverage with 
respect to an establishment-oriented administration and a fundamentally reactionary 
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 The students believed that underneath the “liberal leadership in 
bed with Kennedy” of “organized liberalism” were people who would “support more militant 
action and more far-reaching solutions.”  Therefore, “one of the chief goals of ERAP was to 
galvanize the quiescent populists in the ranks of labor and liberalism.”
23
  In the view of the 
students, the self-proclaimed New Left vanguard, the once progressive labor movement had 
become absorbed into mainstream liberalism, instead of the political challenge that the 
unions represented in the past.  One ERAP paper claimed, “there is a crisis and a paralysis 
among the liberal organizations, and behind it all is the Federal Government encouraging 
mild concessions and preparing to maintain order.”
24
  Therefore, ERAP would be an exciting 
development for “anyone who cares about democratic improvements in our way of life, and 
who remembers with nostalgia and some bitterness the achievements and failures of the 
populist and labor movements of earlier times.”
25
  The students would step in where, for 
many, their parents had failed; the New Left would save the Old. 
The Other America author Michael Harrington clarified the method and strategy of 
ERAP, which set the students up as a prod to the vanguard of the poor, which would step into 
the void left by labor quiescence in an essay on the young radicals: “They are angry militants 
who see the poor as a new force in America, perhaps even as a substitute for the proletariat 
that failed.”
26
  SDS’s criticism of the labor movement’s inaction and failure connected to 
larger disagreements about the methods of liberal anti-poverty programs.  SDS condemned 
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the War on Poverty’s inadequate size, symptomatic (versus fundamental) approach, and 
obfuscation of the poverty population.  The students argue that the problem was not pockets 
of poor amidst “abundance, but rather […] a surface of abundance which prevents us from 
seeing the fact that progress is both producing misery all over and leading us toward severe 
unemployment and economic dislocation.”
27
  However token, Johnson’s War on Poverty and 
spin-off programs like CCAP provided much needed funding and people for the SDS 
“insurgency.”  The War on Poverty dramatized the problem, which raised public 
consciousness of poverty in terms of a social instead of individual issue, which in turn 
legitimizes the fight against poverty “in the way churches made civil rights acceptable.”
28
  
Thus, the widespread national attention on the newly “discovered” problem of poverty 
offered mainstream legitimacy for ERAP.  Michael Harrington, who clearly had close ties to 
the LID and SDS, famously “discovered” Appalachia and poor white people in his 1962 
book The Other America, which in turn inspired Johnson’s anti-poverty program.  ERAP 
offered a grassroots companion or countermovement to the War on Poverty programs. 
From the outset, ERAP took an outside-in grassroots approach to the problem of 
poverty while both CCAP and the War on Poverty adopted a more detached, legislative, top-
down strategy.  The organizers became frustrated by the administration’s approach, which 
often seemed to dump money into the pockets of local officials, robbing the poor community 
of any agency in combating the problem.  The difference in terminology demonstrated 
disagreement in approach: a War on Poverty, and the Crusade Against Poverty, as opposed 
to the non-violent and ambiguous Economic and Research Action Project.  The SDS title 
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deliberately suggests their desire to address the fundamental economic causes of the problem 
of poverty, creating a truly grassroots movement of the poor in order to force structural 
change.  The group held the larger liberal organizations to their promise of creating a 
political voice for the poor, helping to get representation on local War on Poverty councils—
even taking control of the council in Newark.
29
  In contrast, the liberal programs, despite the 
best of intentions, tended to address the symptoms of poverty rather than the causes. 
In his biographical study of SDS, James Miller pointed out, “ERAP projects 
oscillated between alliances with liberal institutions such as the Office of Economic 
Opportunity and hostile attacks on them.  The most tangible victories of the organizers 
involved winning concessions from established authorities.”
30
 As described in more detail 
below, concessions were usually localized demands—traffic lights, or litigation against 
particular landlords.  Furthermore, ERAP’s label emphasizes SDS’s combined impetus of 
“research and action.”  With ERAP, the group sought a synthesis of those goals. The 
different anti-poverty programs along the liberal spectrum initially operated cooperatively, 




INSURGENCY TO THE WAR ON POVERTY 
In 1964, Rennie Davis’ criticism of the legislative tactics of the Crusade Against 
Poverty at the UAW Convention noticeably irritated Reuther.  Davis reported Reuther’s 
accusation that the student misunderstood the vision of CAP, and when he “was young, he 
also failed to understand such matters.”  In his report to SDS, Davis responded indignantly: 
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  Four years later, in 1968, Davis described ERAP as an “insurgency” to the War on 
Poverty, writing, “It is not a phrase signifying fundamental opposition to the War on Poverty.  
Insurgency is conceived as a way to challenge the donor-donee relationship built into the 
army method of dispensing aid and as a set of tactics which help to visibly contrast the 
magnitude of poverty-related programs against Johnson’s token poverty program.”
33
  Davis 
believed of ERAP constituted a righteous challenge to the liberal War on Poverty, forcing the 
administration to uphold the values and promises they were making—specifically, Title II of 
the Equal Opportunity Act. 
The Equal Opportunity Act appropriated $340 million specifically for its Title II, 
which called for Urban and Rural Community Action Programs.  Although the rest of the 
Equal Opportunity Act was no huge deviation from established anti-poverty programs, Title 
II appropriated government funding for community service and organizing.  SDS believed 
that ERAP should seek independent funding, although “refusing to ask for or take federal 
money should not be a principle of the movement.  Instead, we should demand it, realizing 
and planning for the consequences of a grant not being renewed.”
34
  Not only did Title II 
provide a financial well for ERAP, but “Sec. 202 of the Poverty Act provides for ‘maximum 
feasible participation’ of the poor in developing, conducting, and administering the poverty 
program.”
35
 Recognizing that this participation had simply not been realized, SDS organized 
to challenge local leadership and obtain real representation on local poverty boards. 
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 Davis criticized the “corporate giants” and the Johnson administration’s militaristic 
attitude towards poverty as paternalistic and detached.  Furthermore, “in defending civilian 
populations, like an army, they are apt to overpower the ‘enemy’ while trampling the 
people.”
36
  In contrast, ERAP was (or at least hoped to be) the people themselves, in a truly 
democratic movement.  The mainstream program, on the other hand, would work in 
opposition to “fundamental community change” and “local initiative,” the foundational goals 
of ERAP.  The movement that ERAP attempted to organize would be fighting welfare 
agencies, slumlords, and city councils, “all of whom may be major backers to the local War 
on Poverty.”
37
  Therefore, an insurgent response would represent a provocative challenge to 
the liberal strategy.  This was clear from the outset in America and the New Era, which used 
the term “new insurgency.”  The paper proposed, “the populist impulse in labor and 
organizations of liberalism can be reinforced by the emergence of new popular movements, 
articulating their own programs in the face of inadequate ones.”
38
 Michael Harrington 
compared SDS’s strategy to the labor movement of the 1930’s, writing: “the young radicals, 
who have this knack of taking American’s promises seriously, sought a surge from below to 
give meaning to the phrasemaking on high.”
39
  The new insurgency kept in the tradition of 
SDS’s challenge to mainstream liberalism. 
 Davis emphasized that “insurgency” did not necessarily constitute opposition to 
liberal programs, but instead challenged those programs to uphold their own ideals—much 
like the original conception of SDS in relation to mainstream liberalism.  In 1964, at least, 
the New Left existed in parallel to organized liberalism, poking the mainstream when it 
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became “quiescent.”  The student radicals challenged liberals to return to the roots, to the 
foundational democratic values of the United States—they did not oppose those values 
themselves.  Davis concludes:  
 A strategy of insurgent response to the War on Poverty is essentially a fight 
by poor people for control over the existing poverty money and for federal 
support to a real war on poverty.  And that fight begins at the neighborhood 
level, where block groups write their own plans and send them downtown.  
Eventually poor people must get together and make demands on the whole 
national system.  But the beginnings for a more shared abundance and 
democratic participation are found at the neighborhood level where ordinary 





SDS conceived of ERAP as the vehicle that would galvanize the poor, whom SDS 
imagined—even romanticized—as a ripe radical demographic simply in need of leadership.  
Although they established projects in rural Appalachia, the most successful projects focused 
on the urban poor of industrial cities.  The students’ experiences in the Southern Civil Rights 
Movement had inspired them to create a Northern movement to both support and supplement 
the efforts of civil rights groups like SNCC.  
 
FROM FAYETTE COUNTY TO THE GHETTO 
 At the 1964 UAW convention in Atlantic City, Walter Reuther introduced his union’s 
Crusade Against Poverty as part of a strategy to elevate the problem as a moral issue, as 
opposed to an individual problem.  This moralistic strategy was directly inspired by the 
success of the Civil Rights Movement against segregation in the South.  Miller explained: 
“Reuther saw a parallel between CAP and the efforts of the labor unions and the churches to 
bring to the Civil Rights movement […] legitimizing groups which had interests other than 
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  The Southern Civil Rights Movement also inspired SDS—many of the 
student organizers worked down South over the summer on the Freedom Ride campaign.  
Several of the original SDS leaders spoke about how illuminating they found the experience.  
Tom Hayden said before working with SNCC,  “I didn’t realize the dimension, the depth to 
which the South was another country.”
 42
  SDS sent Hayden to “report” on the movement in 
the South, and he wrote pamphlets and article for The Michigan Daily about his experience in 
Fayette County, Tennessee.  Another SDS member, Vivian Leburg Rothstein, said that the 
South felt like an “underdeveloped country,” “desperately poor.”
 43
  However, SDS soon 
realized that although the South felt like “another country,” many of the problems plaguing 
the region existed in their own backyards as well, although sometimes in less explicit ways. 
The students’ experiences in the Civil Rights Movement prompted SDS to start their 
own organizing projects in the North.  The memo announcing an ERAP news service 
described the project as “a growing movement in the North as well as in the South, which is 
combating injustices similar to those in the south.”
44
  Furthermore, Hayden indirectly 
commented on the relationship between ERAP and SNCC: “We are not seeking a dramatic 
movement of conflict,”—a direct allusion to the Southern Civil Rights Movement—“but a 
long series of such movements that change the balance of power.”
45
  The project was set up 
on the SNCC model, where the students lived in the communities they were organizing, and 
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decisions were made democratically by the neighborhood groups.
46
  This process both 
connected the students with the population they were organizing, as well as put the ideals of 
participatory democracy into practice—both elements an effort to embody the ideals of The 
Port Huron Statement. 
SDS wanted the Northern projects to support the Southern movement while giving 
students an alternative so that they didn’t have to “run down to the South,” as Sharon Jeffrey 
put it, to gain organizing experience in the summer.  Jeffrey said that with the establishment 
of ERAP, SDS had to “accept the fact that we have problems in the North and we, as 
Northerners, needed to begin to address those.”
47
  As Carl Wittman of the Chester project 
rationalized, a proportion of the Southern black population was now living in the urban 
industrial North.  He asked, “Aren’t these really the same people we were working with this 
summer?  Why shouldn’t we shift our activities here [Chester], only two miles from 
Swarthmore?”
48
  With momentum and inspiration from the movement in the South, SDS 




There was a more personal racial element involved in SDS’s shift North.  As 
Rothstein later describes, “it had become clear, […] that the role of white radicals could no 
longer be as organizers in black communities and in black organizations.”
 50
 Some students 
felt that being white had held them back in the Southern movement, and no longer wanted to 
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merely be “tagging along” on the Southern campaign.  Thus, SDS specifically sought out 
ethnically white areas of the city in which to organize, with the intention of blunting any poor 
white backlash to the Civil Rights Movement.  SDS would therefore act as Northern allies to 
the movement.  However, when the students actually arrived on site, they were often 
surprised by the demography of the project locations.  As Richie Rothstein later admitted, 
“the fact that most ERAP projects were eventually placed in [mostly non-white] communities 
was not originally intended; the site of the Newark project, for example, was believed to have 
been inhabited much more by working-class whites than was in fact the case.”
 51
  However, 
ERAP’s relationship to the Civil Rights Movement went beyond merely acting as a (white) 
Northern auxiliary.  SDS wanted to provoke a new direction in the national student 
movement because they felt that “the targets of SNCC still remained primarily symbolic”—
SDS wanted to go deeper than the lunch counter.  As one Newark organizer said: “if you 
didn’t have a job, and you couldn’t afford that hamburger, what difference did it make 
whether you were sitting in the front of the restaurant or in the back, or in the restaurant at 
all.”
52
  SDS thought that SNCC and the Southern movement were mistaken to not focus 
specifically on economic issues, and that ERAP would fill that gap.  Rothstein claimed that 
ERAP influenced CORE and SNCC to start organizing around poverty and urban issues, 
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“AN INTERRACIAL MOVEMENT OF THE POOR” 
 The ERAP effort emphasized Students for a Democratic Society as a multi-issue 
organization as the war in Vietnam escalated.  One letter introducing ERAP addressed the 
implications of the escalation of the anti-war movement for SDS as early as 1965: “In the 
past few months, SDS has been increasingly identified to the public solely as an anti-
Vietnam-War group, and its members and supporters have increasingly turned their attention 
to this issue.  We do not wish to devalue SDS’s commitment to opposition towards an 
immoral war, but we feel that its commitment to positive social change through community 
political organizing is no less important.”
54
  SDS saw the peace movement, Civil Rights 
Movement, and labor movement as interrelated, so that the success of one directly affected 
that of the others: “The organization of people in terms of economic issues and interests must 
also embrace the civil rights and peace movements.  ‘Civil Rights’ means little if for the 
great majority of Negro people there are no roads up out of the ghetto.  ‘Peace’ is but a 
hollow dream if alternatives to the war dependent economy are not formulated and made 
politically possible.” Unemployment became the focus of the economic campaign based on 
the belief that, “The social value that income is a reward for productive work can no longer 
be maintained in an economic system that cannot provide work for all its members.”
55
  For 
some in the Civil Rights Movement, the shift from race to class was the “next logical step.”  
Junius Williams, an African-American student at Yale Law and Newark organizer, said that 
ERAP: “was the first chance I had to really confront the harder problems of economics and 
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race together.  It was a class and race thing.  Up until that point I had only been dealing with 
race problems, and that’s what the civil rights movement was all about.”
56
 
 The labor movement was directly connected to this interrelated “Triple Revolution,” 
the ideology dominating America and the New Era.  The triple revolution combined the 
different strains of the left: “Issues now pressing the Labor movement seem to converge with 
those of urban Negroes fighting for equality, and middle-class groups working for 
disarmament.”
57
  America and the New Era hoped for a “reinvigorated” labor movement, 
which they proposed, “could be a major force in the creation of the democratic social order. 
[…] by connecting democracy and economic equality and security, and by fighting in the 
formulation of work rules.”
58
  ERAP applied this strategy, in light of SDS’ that “the 
traditional sources of power for movements for social justice find themselves on the 
defensive. […] The traditional base of labor’s power and social influence – the production 
line workers – is vanishing.”
59
  Once again, the students imagined themselves stepping up 
where labor had failed.  Richard Flacks, an organizer at the first ERAP site in Chicago, wrote 
that the labor movement was the most capable major institution to organize “centers of 
political and economic power which are capable of effectively challenging the dominating 
influence of the corporations.”  However,  “an outstanding tragedy of our time has been the 
labor movement’s tendency to act to protect the jobs of those presently employed and 
presently unionized rather than acting decisively in behalf of those who are presently or 
potentially without jobs.”  Flacks argued that this new movement would be necessarily 
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interracial, since jobs for white and black workers alike were “scarce.”
60
  As ERAP would 
soon discover, despite persuasive argument and logical prediction, unemployment would 
prove to be an unviable organizing strategy since jobs were not, in fact, “scarce,” and 
unemployment was not dramatically on the rise in the mid-sixties. 
 Regardless, ERAP began “an interracial movement of the poor” in 1964 with projects 
in Chester (Pennsylvania), Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, Hazard (Kentucky mining town), 
Baltimore, Cleveland, Louisville, Detroit and Newark.  Thomas Hayden remembered, 
It was almost like a lottery, we did a little analysis of the cities in the United 
States that had the biggest poverty problems, and then sat around trying to 
figure who was going to go there.  I had never been to Newark in my life, but 
I got in a car with a bunch of people, and we moved to Newark; and spent four 





SDS typically chose their sites because the Northern Student Movement had already 
established a project there, or because the conditions of white unemployment made the city 
an obvious choice.  All of the ERAP sites chosen were in remarkably poor areas, excepting 
the Boston project, which was located “in suburban areas among middle-class defense 
workers.  The issue is conversion to a peacetime economy.”
62
 
 Although they strove to create an interracial movement, in most areas the students 
entered on the heels of white flight.  For several locations, once the students arrived on the 
site they realized that the problems they would face were not necessarily the same ones they 
had expected.  As mentioned, the racial composition of the communities was not majority 
white, and discrimination became an unexpectedly explicit issue.  Most significantly, 
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considering the original goals of ERAP, it became quickly clear that the main problem facing 
the ERAP sites was not unemployment, but rather housing, with impending urban renewal 
directly threatening the homes of ghetto residents.  The law of imminent domain forced 
urban residents from their homes in order to make room for public housing tenements, 
expressways, and other projects.  Historians like Kenneth Jackson and Thomas Sugrue have 




Sharon Jeffrey, a leading organizer in Cleveland, remarked after the first few weeks 
onsite on both the unanticipated heterogeneity of Cleveland and the state of public housing in 
the city.  She noticed that slums and poverty were not always visible because of public 
housing, which “is an organized system of poverty as opposed to a community of poverty.”
64
  
The creation of public housing was a component of President Johnson’s 1966 Model Cities 
program.  Thus, the War on Poverty was actually creating problems for the poor that ERAP 
then attempted to ameliorate.  The landscape of urban poor communities resulted in 
decentralization within the ERAP administration.  Michael Harrington wrote that ERAP 
encountered problems when they discovered “the poor are not grouped into incipient 
communities.  A slum street fragments and atomizes people.”
65
  The most effective 
organizing focused on immediate issues, such as garbage removal, or as one site phrased it, 
“rats and roaches” instead of jobs or income.
66
  The localized needs of their projects forced 
the students to adjust their strategies.  Overall, this localization resulted in an organizational 
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decentralization that made a national coordinated organization for ERAP increasingly 
difficult. 
The experience of actually living in the cities meant that ERAP participants witnessed 
the direct effects of the physical reconstruction of American cities after World War II upon 
residents.  Urban renewal and displacement became prominent issues for many of the 
projects.  The first report from the Philadelphia project mentioned an area of Queen Village 
that had privately created and funded a plan to improve housing standards; but the plan 
emphasized home owning in an area of majority tenants.  There was “no provision for the 
Negro members of the community, who will be displaced by the expressway coming through 
in six months.”
67
  Public housing, another liberal program, also became an important issue 
for several of the projects.  Philadelphia reported that “public housing at the same rent rate 
costs more” than private housing.  Furthermore, blacks represented the poorest housing and 
the lowest income of the area.  Additionally, the Philadelphia organizers observed that, 
“when any minority in a neighborhood reaches twenty per cent of the neighborhood 
population, the others start to move out.  This seems to mainly apply to Negroes in our 
area.”
68
 This “tipping point” phenomenon that ERAP observed resulted largely from long-
standing discriminatory practices among real estate and loan agencies, and the resulting 
allegedly de facto segregation perpetuated itself. 
ERAP set up the first project in Chicago, titled JOIN, for “Jobs or Income Now” and 
enabled by the UAW grant.  One of JOIN’s first “actions” was to sell apples on the Chicago 
Loop, “the center of white-collar lower-middle-class employment,” and outside of a Pete 
Seeger concert to reach liberal organizations.  JOIN also sold apples outside of plant-gates on 
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payday.  The ERAP organizers naively intended the apple sales to symbolize Depression-era 
unemployment, reminding “employed workers of threats to their own job security” and 
thereby “arousing interest in JOIN, and raising money.”  Completely unaware of the 
condescension inherent in this “action,” the students hoped that the apples would reinvigorate 
the dormant—The Port Huron Statement’s “acquiescent”—Chicago labor unions.  The 
proposed goal of using the common cause of ERAP to create student-labor alliances was, 
indeed, not just lip service.  However, not surprisingly, “rank-and-file assistance for plant-
gate apple sales never materialized.”
69
 
The Newark Community Union Project, or NCUP, was one of the most successful 
ERAP sites, along with JOIN in Chicago.  Incidentally, NCUP’s success owed much to the 
fact that the project was willing to work for change within the city’s established institutions.  
NCUP agitated the local “liberal coalition” to see race and economics as interrelated.  The 
project focused on organizing block groups, hoping to eventually use the established 
coalition to form “association with homeowners and small businessmen concerned with 
property values, of all things to be concerned about.”
70
  The NCUP was allied with the 
Clinton Hill Neighborhood Council and Newark Committee for Full Employment, and 
eventually achieved Title II representation on Newark’s poverty council.  Joanne Grant’s 
National Guardian article about ERAP pointed out, “The attention it [NCUP] receives from 




The Newark ERAP site greatly benefited from consistent leadership in Tom Hayden, 
who spent four years there.  NCUP embraced housing as the agent of mobilization, and in 
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“An Open Letter to ERAP Supporters and New Organizers,” Hayden wrote: “Today numbers 
of people, probably in the hundreds, live in better conditions because of pressure, or the 
threat of pressure, on their landlords.”
72
  In the letter, Hayden argued against slum clearance 
in recognition that the racist process displaced the poor population in order to gentrify an 
area to attract middle-class whites.  Despite the hypocrisy inherent in that criticism, Hayden’s 
efforts in Newark are commendable if not simply for his longevity. One of the longest 
running sites, SDS eventually abandoned the Newark project as escalating racial tension, 
which eventually imploded in the 1967 riots, made it increasingly uncomfortable for the 
participants as white middle-class organizers in a poor black community. 
ERAP suffered because many of the sites had an abundance of volunteers available in 
the summer, but availability dropped dramatically once the school year began—one of the 
inherent obstacles of a student movement and a specific project which required students to 
physically relocate.  Furthermore, the ERAP organizers lived on a barely subsistence 
budget—there was a competition of sorts between the original sites to test which site could 
spend the least per day on food.  The students worked constantly—when they were not going 
door-to-door talking to the community, or organizing meetings and rent-strikes, or managing 
the day-to-day tasks of the house, they were talking and writing about what they were 
experiencing.  As Sharon Jeffrey later said about her time with ERAP: “We were very 
serious organizers.  We intended to change the world, and our business and our life was 
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THE FAILURE OF ERAP 
The decision of SNCC and the Civil Rights Movement that “it was time for blacks to 
organize their own communities, and for whites to organize their own communities” 
contributed to ERAP’s brevity.  Although ERAP had been conceived as an interracial 
movement, and SDS was connected to the Civil Rights Movement, reality held that the 
majority of the urban poor were black, and the majority of students in SDS were white. 
Junius Williams, an African-American organizer at NCUP, remembered: 
Well, race in the NCUP project was the sleeper. The people who were 
basically in charge were white, and they were from out of the community.  
That became an issue, I won't say a problem, at first, but that became an 
issue to some people in the community because folks were saying well, 
they gonna leave one day, and I'm still gonna to be here.  That was what 
was happening in SNCC in Mississippi and Alabama, and that's why 
SNCC said, White folks, you gotta go.  It wasn't meant in any other way, it 
was meant to say, black folks at some point have to take the responsibility 
for their destiny; and you with your superior skills and knowing how to 
run a meeting, and knowing how to be articulate, and having all of the 





In addition to the rise of Black Power, debates within SDS about the focus of organizing 
effort of a student movement should be in the community or on campus, the essential 
experimental nature of ERAP, and most tangibly the escalation of the Vietnam War all 
contributed to the end of ERAP. 
 
FAILURE: THE CAMPUS VERSUS THE COMMUNITY 
Students for a Democratic Society saw ERAP as an opportunity to “submerge 
themselves” in a community in order to affect real change.  The nature of the project also 
encouraged the student organizers to create personal relationships within the community.  
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This contact helped dispel popular preconceptions amongst the poor and working class of the 
student radicals as “bad or kooky.”
75
  Thus, ERAP symbolized an important and significant 
effort to bridge the divide between the isolated university campus and the city. In his “Open 
Letter,” Hayden presented a challenge to his peers: “Students especially ought to consider 
whether their own needs are satisfied by life in the universities and the professions as now 
constituted, or whether they must find an alternative to staleness by taking sides, risky as it 
may be, with the movement for a truly democratic society we are trying to build.”
76
 
 However, some within the ranks of SDS questioned whether it was responsible of the 
student movement to try to organize the urban poor at the expense of middle-class 
communities, both on the campus and within the society at large.  Paul Potter, president of 
SDS from 1965-66, warned the student movement of over-emphasizing the “problems of the 
dispossessed,” which did not alter campus issues.  Potter believed that if the radicals were to 
achieve a true American revolution that “the voiceless would have to become partners in a 
radical coalition that took seriously the ‘growing frustration of certain elements of the middle 
class.’”  Potter claimed, “It is through the experience of the middle class and the aesthetic of 
bureaucracy and mass society that the vision and program of participatory democracy will 
come—if it is to come.”
77
  He argued that it would be a mistake on the part of the students to 
ignore the middle-class frustrations that had driven them to the movement in the beginning. 
In “Words Butter No Parsnips: Remarks on the Nature of Community Political 
Organizing,” Steve Max, who served as the first LID liaison to the campus after the LID-
SDS split in 1965, assessed the community organizing phenomenon of the mid-sixties.  Max 
attributed the creation of ERAP not to inspiration from the labor movement, nor the Civil 
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Rights Movement, nor mainstream liberalism, but to the inescapable middle-class status of 
the students.  He tried to answer the question, “Where does the conception of the 
improvement of a community through the primary activity of its inhabitants come from?”  
Max proposed, somewhat counter-intuitively yet perceptively, “The answer lies hidden in the 
very middle-class attitudes which the student brings to ghetto activity.  It lies in the Horatio 
Alger rhetoric that anyone can make it if they try, that the poor don’t try hard enough and 
don’t care enough.”
78
  Through this logic, the poor need only to act, and the students can help 
them do so in their role as “catalyst midwife.”  Max recognized the inevitable localization of 
this approach: “While it is true that there is refuse in the hall because people don’t remove it, 
it is also true that there is refuse in the hall because the landlord doesn’t provide cans for it 
and the city doesn’t remove it.”  Consequently, “What is entailed here is the building of 
block-by-block, district-by-district political organizations; not splinter groups or protest 




Although informed by middle-class values, the students never applied the program of 
ERAP to their own communities.  Don McKelvey pointed out that in the context of SDS’s 
analysis of a domestic economic crisis based on the inability of the system to deal with 
automation-provoked unemployment, combined with the international crisis in Southeast 
Asia, “the political response of the middle class—especially the automation-prone lower 
middle class—will be extremely important.  The possibility of a fascist response—involving 
domestic conservatism and, especially, international adventurism—is much too great not to 
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be organized against now.”
80
  In April 1965, when the national structure of ERAP was in its 
last throes, Steve Bookchester of Chicago’s JOIN asked in the ERAP Newsletter: “Should 
this organization, which grew out of the campus, have ever gone out to try and organize the 
urban poor in the first place?”  Bookchester accused the project of lacking the “courage” to 
work on campus.  He wrote: 
And why do we run from the middle-class communities?  True, SDS 
seemingly rejects the values of middle-class America.  But it is also true, it 
seems, that any way one would define middle-class, the vast majority of 
SDS members come from middle-class backgrounds.  Why don’t we set up 
a project in a typical middle-class community, perhaps a suburb, and attempt 





Bookchester’s inquiries represent a rare direct contemporary acknowledgment of the 
problematic relationship between the students and their middle-class origins, and an 
additional dimension to the debate within SDS about organizing off-campus. 
In his essay “On the Problem of the New Left,” League of Industrial Democracy 
Executive Secretary Thomas Kahn pointed out perhaps the biggest problem inherent in the 
students ERAP effort: “Voluntary poverty, precisely because it is voluntary, is never real 
poverty.”
 82
  The students had the choice to leave the ghettoes—and they did—whereas of 
institutional and structural discrimination entrapped (and entrap) the poor there.  This 
fundamental difference between the students and the poor made the broader movement-
oriented goals of ERAP impossible.  Kahn recognized, “The students are in rebellion against 
middle-class values and ways of living.  The poor, on the other hand, want nothing so much 
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as to get into the middle class, and they are interested in tangible activities toward that end. 
[…] But the point is that between the students and the poor there is no essential identity of 





FAILURE: THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF AN EXPERIMENTAL PROJECT 
Experiments produce information for 
organizers, not necessarily mass movements. 
Richie Rothstein, 




The national ERAP structure had “dissolved” by the spring of 1965—less than a year 
after Chabot began work in Chicago.  Although individual projects, including Chicago, 
Cleveland, and Newark, survived for a time, SDS rationalized national dissolution because 
the issues of ERAP became very localized.  In 1968, ERAP chronicler Rothstein pointed out 
that “not since March 1965 had any two ERAP organizing staffs sat down together to 
evaluate and discuss their work.”
85
  The pamphlet “Economic Research and Action Project: 
An Introductory Statement” lists the purposes of ERAP in this order: “1. Stimulate 
discussion, 2. Research and publication, 3. Action and organization, 4. Aid other groups, 5. 
Facilitate an “alliance between student radicals and progressive labor unions.”
86
  While the 
inclusion of a student-union alliance is noteworthy, more significant is that action and 
organization lie third on the list.  ERAP was in every way an experiment for SDS; as Richie 
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Rothstein later wrote, “How could a project experiment with factory organizing, or consumer 
organizing, or draft-resistance organizing, in such a context?”
87
 
One ERAP organizer later proclaimed that: “I was the one who got organized, by the 
people I was organizing.”
88
 Although the ERAP experiment was an important and invaluable 
lesson for the organizers, an “interracial movement of the poor” failed to materialize.  Most 
of the projects were unable to accomplish any substantial change beyond rent strikes and 
occasional legal victories against slumlords.  The only tangible achievements of the national 
ERAP project were, in fact, concessions from the liberal establishment: a pioneering free-
lunch program in the Cleveland public schools, and the locally-elected anti-poverty board in 
Newark was granted funding for a recreational center.  ERAP did not significantly affect the 
established institutions of city politics.  As early as 1964, GROIN (Garbage Removal or 
Income Now) overcame JOIN (Jobs or Income Now) within the ERAP movement, and the 
programs become increasingly localized.  Rothstein explains: “The issues shifted from 
national full employment to more local issues—Welfare administration, housing conditions, 
local city housekeeping issues.  The original rationale was soon lost, however, as ERAP 
found local political structures to be so rigid that not even petty reforms, completely 




In the end, ERAP’s most important success was serving as a sort of organizer boot 
camp.  Most students did not stay on a project anywhere near as long as Hayden’s four-year 
stint in Newark.  Most students only worked for a summer before returning to the universities 
to organize campus reform projects and mobilize Vietnam protest.  However, the original 
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goal to facilitate a student-union alliance through ERAP completely failed.  Originally allied 
with the liberal establishment, “Before too long, this attitude of most ERAP organizers 
toward the organizations of labor and the liberal middle class changed from one of hope to 
one of the deepest hostility and contempt.”
90
  In his retrospective 1968 article, Rothstein 
wrote: “The ERAP structure was set up to test particular hypotheses about American society.  
When these hypotheses were abandoned, the structure suffered a similar fate. […] If structure 
should follow function, then the demise of ERAP was as it should be.”
91
  The growing anti-
war movement, a more immediate and viable issue, soon consumed the attention of the 
student radicals. 
 
FAILURE: THE ESCALATION OF THE VIETNAM WAR 
The founders of Students for a Democratic Society initially intended the group to be a 
multi-issue organization for democratic change.  The original group had deep domestic 
concerns, including problems within American society like poverty and discrimination that 
they attempted to address in ERAP.  SDS never anticipated that it would become identified 
solely as an anti-war group.  Organizer Carolyn Craven voiced this awareness: “We didn’t 
want to become a single issue organization and if we emphasized the war, that’s the path we 
were heading down.”  However, the war overseas overshadowed all of the students’ efforts at 
home.  Carl Oglesby, in his 1969 summary of the last decade of student action, wrote that in 
1965, “The war abruptly becomes the leading issue for most white radicals.  But not for 
community organizers, some of whom in fact are bitter about the new preoccupation.”
92
  
                                                
90
 Rothstein, “ERAP and How it Grew,” 20. 
91
 Ibid., 26. 
92
 Carl Oglesby, “Notes on a Decade Ready for the Dustbin,” Liberation (New York: Students for a Democratic 
Society, 1969), 2, Pamphlet Collection, Socialism Series, Labadie Collection, University of Michigan. 
74 
 
Todd Gitlin later recalled the end of ERAP and the emerging unavoidability of the anti-war 
movement:  “We thought we were not going to be able to evade Vietnam, Vietnam was 
coming after us and we’d better get ready for it.  The war was going to become central to 
SDS whether we liked it or not.  And for the most part SDS didn’t because we had domestic 
concerns that took priority.”  Tom Hayden expressed a similar view to the relationship 
between the war and SDS’ agenda: “I already thought that we were going to, um, run into 
real troubles because of the lack of funding or commitment to the domestic problems of jobs 
and poverty, because of the war.” The anti-war movement was drawing bodies, funding, and 
momentum away from the ERAP effort, and the intensification of the anti-war movement 
played a significant role in the abandonment of ERAP.  Hayden acknowledged that, “By 67, 
most of us felt that the war had undermined our project of trying to create this interracial 
movement of the poor in the cities, and in the South, and in Appalachia; and it was really the 
war that had become our ultimate problem to confront.”
93
 
 The escalating war effort meant very different things for poor communities of the 
ERAP sites than it did for the students there.  In the early stages of the war, the students 
received automatic draft deferments.  The poor and working-class communities, on the other 
hand, were sending their sons and husbands to fight in Vietnam.  James Miller reported, “As 
Jeffrey discovered during the summer of 1965, many poor people, though hostile to local 
police and welfare officials, clung to the American version of the myth of the Good King.”
94
  
Jeffrey understood poor and working-class support for the war because she recognized that 
the people fighting the war needed to believe that the administration was sending those men 
to fight for an underlying good cause.  The radical coalition that ERAP sought to galvanize 
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became impossible, partly due to the privilege of the students that had made the project 
problematic from the outset. 
 
THE LEGACY OF THE ECONOMIC RESEARCH AND ACTION PROJECT 
Fundamental flaws in the strategy of the movement contributed to the ultimate failure 
of ERAP.  For one, rising unemployment was simply not a priority problem in most cities, as 
the students quickly discovered.
 95
  Although most of the sites attempted to adjust to local 
demands, they “oscillated between alliances with liberal institutions such as the Office of 
Economic Opportunity and hostile attacks on them.”
96
  This indecisive approach complicated 
the increasingly tenuous relationship between the New Left and mainstream liberalism.  
Also, it was at this time (1965) that SDS was in the process of becoming completely 
autonomous from the LID. 
Nelson Lichtenstein argues that the ERAP years represented a vital opportunity for 
the alliance of labor and the New Left.  Lichtenstein wrote of the 1964 Atlantic City 
Convention that SDS was in attendance “because Reuther invited them, but more important, 
because for this brief moment in the history of American liberalism the UAW and SDS 
shared an equally radical agenda.”
97
  The ERAP projects and rhetoric did have a perceptible 
impact on liberal-labor community projects.  However, many ERAP veterans expressed 
contradictory views about the radicalism of American liberalism.  As Richie Rothstein 
pointed out, “The use of ERAP rhetoric by the United Auto Workers elite in the Citizens’ 
Crusade Against Poverty is a far cry from the galvanization of the UAW rank and file to 
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  Although CCAP and the UAW articulated many of the same goals as 
ERAP, they contributed only funding for a project in great need of corporeal support.  
Despite its rhetoric, SDS placed CCAP much closer to the ineffectual programs of Johnson’s 
War on Poverty—Model Cities and urban renewal, the unrepresentative poverty boards—
than with their own ERAP. 
For many in SDS, ERAP exposed institutional liberalism as hypocritical and 
hopeless.  The movement transitioned from willingness and even a desire to work within the 
institutions of American liberalism to a fundamental opposition to the mainstream left. 
Rothstein continued, 
We are now enemies of welfare-state capitalism […] We view these [liberal-
labor] forces—and the system they might have espoused—as being 
incompatible with a non-interventionist world policy and no more than a 
manipulative fraud perpetuated upon the dignity and humane aspirations of 
the American people. This last conclusion we owe in large measure to four 
years of ERAP experience.  In a healthy pragmatic style we tested an 




Rothstein’s statement indicated a shift for SDS from alliance with established liberalism, 
working in conjunction with programs like the War on Poverty and the Crusade Against 
Poverty, to direct opposition.  In his 1966 essay assessing “The Mystical Militants,” Michael 
Harrington also observed this shift: “The welfare state is, they [the young radicals] say, a 
fraud.  And the liberals, who actually boast of having created this monster in the name of 
humane values, are therefore the worst hypocrites.”
100
  Rothstein dismissed “liberal labor 
forces” as a “manipulative fraud” and acknowledged the experimental nature of ERAP with a 
positive spin.  Rothstein made these conclusions based on a project that could not sustain 
itself at the national level for much more than a year.  He speculated, “Whether ERAP was 
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justified in concluding after so [s]hort a trial that the ranks of labor and liberalism could not 
be galvanized by the power of our example, and that the power structure was totally 




 The ERAP experiment meant more to the New Left than dismissal of the liberal-labor 
establishment, however.  As James Miller pointed out, “Long after the experiments had 
wound down, it was possible to point to an example like Cleveland and say, ‘Look, this is 
participatory democracy in practice; this is the radical alternative.’”
 102
  Harrington also 
defended the effort in spite of its possible failure, emphasizing middle-class values of the 
students, which were projected on the poor they tried to organize.  Harrington concluded 
about ERAP: “By going into the slum, they are doing penance for the sins of affluence; by 
sharing the life of those who are so impoverished that they are uncorrupted, values are 
affirmed.  It is honest and moral and antihypocritical to be on the margin of society whether 
the community organization works or not.”
103
 
The shift towards Vietnam protest was in a way beneficial to ERAP’s fate: “By the 
time the projects finally collapsed, the attention of journalists and radicals had shifted to the 
mounting protests against the Vietnam War.  The image of participatory democracy survived 
untarnished.  Of course, organizers who had lived through the experiments were in a position 
to know better.”
104
  ERAP might have failed in realizing the utopian visions of socialist 
commonwealths set forth in The Port Huron Statement, but in the end the project has a 
decisive impact on the New Left, both politically and personally.  SDS president Paul Potter 
                                                
101
 Rothstein, “ERAP and How it Grew,” 23. 
102
 Miller, Democracy is in the Streets, 216. 
103
 Harrington, “The Mystical Militants,” 35. 
104
 Miller, Democracy is in the Streets, 216. 
78 
 
explained: “People in SDS […] had seen a chance to go directly for the jugular vein of the 
system.  We leapt and missed and came up, not with a new society, but with a slightly 
different portion of the well-chewed piece of gristle so many American radicals had gnawed 
and choked on before.”
105
  Although inherently flawed and largely lost in the memory of the 
student movement, the students’ efforts to organize the poor represented important 
transgressions of their middle-class boundaries which impacted the direction of the 
movement which came to define the last years of the sixties.  The looming presence of 
Vietnam quickly became unavoidable for SDS, and in the last years of the decade erupted 
and the war ripped both the movement and the liberal coalition to pieces. 
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 If the Economic Research and Action Project had been successful as an organizer 
boot camp, then it mobilized the Students for a Democratic Society for the Vietnam War.  As 
early as 1965, it became clear that the anti-war movement required immediate organization.  
Although the Vietnam War itself drafted mostly working-class and poor men, thanks to draft 
deferments for students, the anti-war movement took bodies, funding, and attention from 
domestic SDS projects such as ERAP.  The anti-war effort attracted many new members, and 
the swelling SDS membership challenged the organization’s ideal of internal participatory 
democracy.  The direct, immediate action required to mobilize against the Vietnam War 
directly contributed to SDS’s self-implosion, and to the consequent suppression of an allied 
worker-student radical vanguard. 
SDS eliminated their constitutional clause designed to prohibit Communists from 
membership in 1965—certainly not coincidentally when its membership mushroomed as 
anti-war organizing attracted unprecedented numbers of students.  The evolution of SDS over 
the course of the sixties produced an unsustainable organization, and by the end of the decade 
SDS ultimately transformed completely from what the Ann Arbor core had initially 
instigated.  In his 1969 article, “Notes on a Decade Ready for the Dustbin,” SDS leader and 
president Carl Oglesby asked: 
What was the Atlantic City of the white student movement that was to go 
from pro-peace to anti-war, anti-war to pro-NLF [Vietnam’s National 
Liberation Front], pro-NLF to anti-imperialist to pro-Third World revolution 
to anti-capitalism to pro-socialism—and thence, with much more confusion 
and uncertainty than this schedule implies, to anti-peace (i.e., no co-existence) 
80 
 
and anti-democracy (“bourgeois jive”), and which finds itself at the present 
moment broken into two, three, many factions, each of which claims to have 




Indeed, how did an organization with “democratic society” embedded in its very name, 
within the few years between the unavoidable escalation of Vietnam in 1965 and the turmoil 
of 1968, come to advocate anarchy and violent revolution? 
SDS shifted from advocating for a democratic society to fighting to destroy that 
society.  The Marxist-Leninist Progressive Labor Party was actively attempting to take over 
SDS by the chaotic 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago.  James Miller pointed 
out: “With its disciplined, puritanical style and dogmatic commitment to create a dictatorship 
of the proletariat in America, the Progressive Labor faction stood against most of what once 
had defined the New Left as new.”
2
  The defining organization of the New Left had, by 1968, 
circled back upon itself and until it much more closely embodied the very Old Left it had 
originally stood apart from.  By 1968, SDS simply was not the same organization that drafted 
The Port Huron Statement in 1962, and no longer synonymous with the New Left.  Many 
members of New Left organizations were dropping out of the student movement or 
splintering off—some, like former SDS leader Paul Booth, became union organizers. 
Looking back on his time in SDS, Booth expressed regret for missed opportunity in 
the sixties: “Unfortunately, the Old Left didn’t influence us: we viewed them as intellectually 
bankrupt.  But they were the only people in the society who knew what mass action was, who 
knew what a mass organization was or how you worked in one.”
3
  Perhaps the students made 
a fatal misstep in their initial reluctance to identify with their predecessors.  They wrote and 
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spoke about stepping into the gap that the unions had left when they retreated from 
progressivism and about forcing mainstream liberalism to fulfill the promises of which their 
parents had failed to follow through.  However, Booth suggested that the students’ failure to 
learn from the Old could have irrevocably handicapped the SDS in particular, which was 
unable to deal with the internal consequences of its massive growth in the late sixties. 
SDS continued to reach out to organized labor even as SDS became an increasingly 
single-issue organization, but the rapid radicalization of the second generation of the New 
Left alienated much of the larger society.  Although cultural memory of the student 
movement might suggest otherwise, the political similarities of students—the self-proclaimed 
“new-working-class”
4
—and workers even in the divisive last years of the sixties provided 
realistic ground for a coalition.  Polls demonstrated that many blue-collar workers disagreed 
with the war in Vietnam and supported the student’s anti-corporatist domestic agenda.  
However, influenced by media sensationalism and exaggeration, the differences between 
labor and the New Left, including SDS and the UAW, overshadowed their fundamentally 
similar interests, and the postwar liberal coalition finally imploded in the critical years of the 
late sixties. 
 
THE ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT: SDS OUTGROWS ITSELF 
So what does geometry have to do with the 
Viet-nam War? 
Students for a Democratic Society, 
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The conflict in Vietnam represented the aspects of American culture, politics, and 
society that SDS had been working to reform since the late fifties.  In fact, Vietnam was 
arguably the most extreme manifestation of the Cold War culture that had originally spawned 
SDS.  Hesitant from the outset to become a single-issue organization, SDS instead attempted 
to use anti-war protest as a catalyst to synthesize several of the main points of its ideology, 
which condensed most simply to anti-corporate imperialism, imposed from the ghettos of 
Newark to the Cambodian jungle. 
Miller pointed out, “Before the Berkeley rebellion, student protests had been largely 
limited to petitions, rallies and pickets.  The Free Speech Movement suggested that more 
militant techniques, including sit-ins, the occupation of buildings and strikes, could be 
effective on campus.  For young radicals, the sense of new possibilities was intoxicating.”
6
  
By the mid-sixties the New Left as a whole was moving in a more militant direction, 
symbolized by the 1964 Free Speech Movement in Berkeley
7
 and more vividly by SNCC’s 
shift towards Black Power and the Black Panther Party, which argued United States 
imperialism domestically manifested in the internal colonization of urban ghettos.  Black 
Power pushed white organizers out of the Civil Rights Movement, and the Vietnam War 
provided a new and prominent issue to organize around.  A new leadership style emerged in 
SDS simultaneous to the growing dominance of anti-war protest.  Somewhat paradoxically, 
Tom Hayden—fresh from the NCUP site—helped pioneer the new anti-leadership, which 
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then-president Paul Booth deemed “imitation SNCC.”
8
  In fact, SNCC issued a statement 
opposing the war and encouraging active draft resistance in January 1966.  Although by this 
time SDS identified itself as a northern, urban SNCC, they did not issue an equivalent 
statement until December of that year.
9
 
 At the December 1964 National Council meeting of SDS, the Council initially 
defeated a proposal to organize a march in Washington, DC to protest the war.  After a close 
re-vote, SDS planned the demonstration for the collegiate spring vacation in order to 
facilitate maximum student participation.  The April demonstration brought at least 15,000 
and by some accounts as many as 25,000 people, primarily students, to the national capital to 
demonstrate opposition to the rapidly escalating war in Vietnam.  It was perhaps the most 
successful mass demonstration SDS would ever sponsor.   
At the march, SDS President Paul Potter gave a moving and poignant speech from the 
National Mall.  Potter said: “But now the war in Vietnam has provided the incredibly sharp 
razor that has finally separated thousands and thousands of people from their illusions about 
the decency and morality and the integrity of this country’s purposes internationally; and that 
is a bitter and saddening insight for people who grew up as we did, believing the things we 
did about our country.”
 10
  Potter articulated the philosophy behind The Port Huron Statement 
and the principles motivating America and the New Era and its offspring, ERAP.  Notably, 
the March occurred at the height of ERAP organizing.  The trends detailed—the increased 
militancy of the Civil Rights Movement and the escalation of the Vietnam War—occurred 
simultaneously to ERAP, forcing SDS to make organizational choices and sacrifices.  For 
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this generation, a product of the “comfortable” fifties, the Vietnam War made painfully 
obvious the superficiality of that comfort that SDS had been trying to expose in American 
society. 
The war was the very antithesis of democratic.  Potter connected American 
imperialism and Cold War foreign policy to domestic discrimination and denial of political 
power: 
What kind of a system is it that justifies the United States or any country in 
seizing the destinies of other people and using them callously for our own 
ends?  What kind of a system is it that disenfranchises people in the South, 
that excludes millions and millions of people from the mainstream and 





He proposed, “We must name that system, and we must change it and control it, else it will 
destroy us.”
 12
  Potter specifically did not name the system in question (nor does he specify 
the “us”).  Thus, in 1965 SDS still emphasized what they were fighting for: democracy.  As 
Carl Oglesby pointed out, the government was “fighting in Vietnam to save those poor 
people for the free world; in fact what [they] were doing was opposing those great ideas. 
With every can of napalm that got dropped, the American Constitution died a little bit; with 
every village taken out the Declaration of Independence became a little bit more 
meaningless. We couldn’t possibly call ourselves a democracy-loving people and let that war 
in Vietnam go on.”
13
 
 James Miller provided an astute summary of how the anti-war march on Washington 
provided an apex for the student movement, especially as a high point in the evolution of 
SDS.  Miller pointed out the surprisingly traditional organization of the March: “The form of 
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the protest was orthodox—a group of citizens submitting a petition to their elected 
representatives.”  He described the way that the moment in Washington represented the 
growth of SDS: “But the mood of the moment transcended its carefully calibrated 
symbolism.  At a camp in Port Huron three years before, sixty people, after four days 
experiencing the pleasures of face-to-face political debate, had ratified a document calling for 
participatory democracy.”  This debate at the UAW camp led to ERAP, a project initially 
funded by the UAW in which, “in a few inner-city ghettos during the last twelve months, 
small circles of friends had probed the limits of democracy in practice, trying to change 
themselves, and to change America.”  These experimental “small circles” had grown, and 
“Now they were marching with thousands of others on Congress.  Walking 80 abreast, they 
clogged the Washington Mall.  The vision of participatory democracy crystallized in a new 
experience, a new sense of power, a new sentiment of solidarity.”
14
 
SDS did not choose Vietnam as their cause—in fact, some within the movement 
actively resisted organizing against the war; however, in a way, the war chose SDS.  The 
conflict in Vietnam was so obviously anti-democratic, both domestically in the draft as well 
as internationally as an imperialistic attempt to colonize Southeast Asia for American 
corporations, that SDS could not avoid the necessary call of the anti-war movement.  Anti-
war organizing attracted more students to SDS because it affected them immediately and 
directly in ways that prior SDS issues like the dissatisfaction of an automated economy and 
the political potential of the poor simply did not.  By the conclusion of the April 1965 march, 
SDS was “the undisputed leader of an anti-war movement that was growing far more rapidly 
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than anyone had anticipated.”
 15
  Paul Booth observed of SDS’s anti-war momentum:  “We 
are really the only thing moving, but we are moving very very rapidly.”
16
 
 The momentum of SDS introduced thousands of new members to political 
organizing, creating a second generation of sixties student activists.  The swelling 
membership complicated the increasingly prominent struggle within SDS over whether or 
not to support the Democratic Party.  New members were largely ignorant of SDS’s 
“previous commitment to pluralism and experimentation, many of them resentful of the 
apparent lack of interest of the ERAP avant-garde in campus organizing.”  The second 
generation also lacked some of the direct Old Left connections of the SDS founders.  As 
Miller described, “Most members of this new generation not only were inexperienced but 
also did not have the kind of political family history that had helped make SDS leaders like 
Max and Booth into such precocious activists.”
17
 
SDS began to have increasing difficulty maintaining a democratic internal structure 
beneath the weight of the new membership.  Jonathan Eisen, an observer at an SDS 
conference, wrote to The Activist: 
The SDS has had a hard time coming to terms with its new importance on the 
national scene and … is groping around trying to reduce the hiatus between 
necessity and its rather inadequate structural capabilities.  One of the tasks of 
the conference was to grapple with the hard fact that unless the SDS can 
overcome its organization limitations, its influence and magnetism are likely 




Moreover, new members began to suspect the “old guard” of the Port Huron group of being 
some sort of intra-SDS elite, and anti-elitism and anti-hierarchy began to define an internal 
lack of structure at the very moment the swelling organization required a concentrated 
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national vision.  Notably, after 1963’s America and the New Era, SDS did not issue another 
organizationally definitive working paper. 
 Attempting to capitalize on its growing constituency and add to its base of support, 
SDS concentrated on acting against university connections to the “war machine,” accusing 
administrators of acting as “arms of the government.”  Many students were shocked to learn 
that universities across the country used research facilities for defense research, and began to 
call upon their institutions to uphold a moral standard of research.
19
  Despite reluctance to 
embrace anti-war organizing at the expense of SDS’s domestic program, which organizers 
like Hayden and Haber felt was of primary importance, the war quickly dominated the 
organization.  Moreover, the draft made many American college students more intimately 
connected to the war.  Students were initially protected from the draft with automatic 
deferments, and SDS member Sue Eanet Klonsky acknowledged that, “Middle class kids had 
the privilege of not serving so there was this hugely disproportionate mass of low income 
guys, kids of color being drafted and coming back dead.”  However, in response for 
increased troop deployment, the Selective Service instituted an examination system wherein 
student exemption required a certain academic standard.  Tom Hayden pointed out the 
paradox of drafting the disenfranchised: 
A very important thing that people always forget that we couldn’t vote.  It 
wasn’t just that the people who were African-American in the South were 
shackled and disenfranchised by a system that said you can’t vote, or you 
can’t vote without putting your life in danger; but there were four, five, six, 
seven million American college students who couldn’t vote. So when people 
today say why did you work outside the system or what do you think about 
outside or inside the system it’s a hilarious question to me since I was outside 
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SDS began to demonstrate against university administrators’ “complicity with the war” after 
the new merit-exemption system implicated the universities in the war machine still more 
deeply because the government required them to provide students transcripts to determine 
exemption.  The involvement of universities in defense research and recruitment was an 
established protest from the Reuther brothers’ SLID days to the first anti-war protests in Ann 
Arbor.
21
  In their continual search for common ground, SDS attempted to reach out to the 
working-class community on the basis of a shared systematic oppression under their 
respective bosses. 
 SDS sought to translate the lessons and experience of the Economic Research and 
Action Project into anti-war organizing.  “We’ve Got to Reach Our Own People,” first 
published in December 1967 and later re-published in SDS’s organizing manual Don’t 
Mourn—Organize!, it outlined a strategy for anti-war resistance to “root itself in poor white 
and lower paid working class communities.”
22
  The SDS authors believed that the urgency of 
the draft would allow SDS to break through the boundaries between “workers and welfare 
recipients,” omitting the time-consuming conscious-raising phase of typical campaigns.  The 
authors recognized that the working class and poor communities were actually fighting the 
war, and thus rationalized that these communities were the ripest for resistance.  The students 
did not consider that their personal military involvement in Vietnam might require those 
communities to believe in the cause behind the war.  Furthermore, although well intentioned, 
the proposed approach was condescending in that by separating themselves from the “lower 
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classes” the students were in fact affirming their own privilege.  The article suggested that 
these poor and working-class citizens are thus far “unmoved” by the anti-war movement 
because of “massive, unthinking, unchallenged racism and patriotism (anti-communism) 
which these communities share with the rest of white America.”
23
 
The article proposed that SDS employ the ERAP-tested strategy of moving into a 
community to organize the inhabitants using leaflets, the establishment of a community 
center, and a regular newsletter.  In this case, instead of unemployment and housing councils, 
however, the purpose would be to organize “community based draft resistance unions.”  
Sharing ERAP’s concept of the student organizer provoking the true vanguard of the 
American working class, the proposal declared: “Students are most often the troops of the 
movement, but they are not all the people.  A significant resistance to the war and to the 
unrepresentative political machine which directs it must be based not only among students 
but among working people.”
24
 
SDS member Lee Webb argued for a similar strategy in SDS’s second installment in 
the self-published series Manuals on Organizing to End the War in Vietnam, “Vietnam and 
the Unions.”  Webb argued that the unions were ripe for resistance because of their radical 
history, and because trade unionists were likely to be personally affected by the Vietnam 
War.  Webb criticized the labor movements recent quiescence but saw anti-war protest as a 
hopeful motivator for a resurgence of union militancy, stating that despite the simultaneous 
“absence of any meaningful internal trade union politics” and a fifteen-year legacy of 
consistent support “of the administration’s cold war foreign policy.  […]  In the past year, the 
trade union movement, stimulated by the civil rights movement and internal dissatisfaction of 
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Webb cited UAW Secretary-Treasurer and vocal opponent of the war Emil Mazey, 
who spoke publicly against the war until pressure from George Meany of the AFL-CIO and 
the UAW’s own Walter Reuther forced Mazey to back down.  The union leader remained 
influential, and UAW Local 600, a large and historically militant Michigan local, ran an anti-
war Mazey speech in their paper, which circulated amongst 50,000 members.  Webb claimed 
that the trade union rank-and-file was “isolated,” with “no vehicle for expressing their 
dissatisfaction” with the liberal administration.  He urged student organizers to avoid trying 
to contact “higher-ups” in the unions, who gave money but not bodies to the march.  Webb 
instead encouraged potential organizers to focus on galvanizing local rank-and-file resistance 
on the points of draft resistance, trade union freedom to strike, threats to domestic social 
policy and change, and general morality.  Webb concluded: “the important thing here is to 




STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY’S 1968 WORK-IN 
Taking the application of ERAP’s strategy more directly and further, in the summer 
of 1968 350 students took jobs in factories and offices to “talk with working people about the 
Vietnam war, racism, the student movement and topical political questions.”  The stated goal 
of this quasi-anthropological experiment was not to organize the workers but to understand 
their position.  The students felt isolated from the American working class and conducted the 
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Work-In to end that separation.  One participant exhibited his middle-class isolation when he 
attested to discovering, “Workers are just the opposite of what our professors tell us they are.  
Rather than the failures of society, they are the prime movers.  Only they can keep 
production going; only they can grind production to a halt; and only they can overthrow the 
bosses.”  Admittedly, many of the Work-In participants joined the project experimentally: 
“Other students were mainly concerned with their special middle class background, and 
wanted to broaden their outlook.”
27
  SDS published a pamphlet compiling the experiences of 
students throughout the Work-In sites.  They experienced varying degrees of success; one 
student was naïve enough to admit his communist ideology within the first couple of days, 
and other students forged genuinely symbiotic friendships with their co-workers. 
The students involved in the Work-In made a deliberate attempt to dispel popular 
misconceptions about the New Left, which in the public mind had become increasingly 
entangled with the counterculture.  Although one student working at a New York trucking 
plant admitted he was a Communist his third night on the job, he claimed that even that was 
okay in the end because, “I worked hard, but not too hard.  I wear normal clothes and have 
short hair.  I fought against the wise-guy attitude that is inculcated in students.  The workers 
reacted much more adversely to two bearded, beaded long-haired hippies who worked on the 
platform for two nights.  The hippies managed to project the attitude that workers who did 
this every night for years to support their families were stupid; that if only you were clever 
this is ‘post-scarcity society.’”
28
  One befriended worker declared to a Work-In student: “The 
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reason they’re soaking us [low pay] is to kill more commies in Vietnam and get to the moon 
faster.  I say let them live—what the hell are we doing in Vietnam anyway?  And as far as the 
moon goes, I hope they never get there, because if they do get there they’ll just make a mess 
of it.”
29
  The participants also tried to remind the workers of their own radical history.  One 
challenged his Chicago co-workers, “Would we be making $3.50 an hour unless some guys 
had been willing to go on strike and use violence against scabs and cops protecting them?”
30
 
The Work-In students were generally quick to realize the sharp differences between 
the middle and the working classes, and they typically agreed that racism was a mechanism 
of the “ruling class” to pit divisions of the working class against one another.  The Boston 
Work-In group, one of the largest, reflected on one of the most remarkable collective 
experiences in the project.  While individual students or very small groups facilitated many 
of the sites, the Boston project was distinctive because it connected sixty to seventy students 
to the same project.  The participants wrote: “We are convinced [in Boston] that strikes and 
economic demands must be supported, that a worker-student alliance must be built if SDS is 
going to become a viable and politically effective group.”
31
  In the same vein that the 
cognizant Boston SDS member who challenged ERAP for not organizing middle-class 
communities—actually reaching “our own people,” as they sought to do—the Boston Work-
In group argued, “In fact, every struggle in which students are engaged will be in alliance 
with workers; it is not just a question of walking picket lines every now and then.”  They 
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extended the argument, questioning the true nature of the student movement’s opposition to 
the war.  They asked provocative questions about the self-interest of the anti-war movement: 
For instance, do we fight for NO DRAFT FOR VIETNAM, or do we fight 
to retain our student exemptions, at the expense of working people?  Do 
we oppose Dow recruiters because we are more appalled by napalm than 
liberals are, or do we opposed Dow because the use of napalm reflects a 
consistent policy to exploit and suppress workers by any means necessary, 
in Vietnam or anywhere else?  At Harvard, do we oppose the newest fee 
hike only because it makes our lives more difficult, or do we oppose 
Harvard’s entire system of systematically excluding working class 




These questions probably hit the mark too closely for many students.  The Boston group 
concluded: “Here are two important movements in America today: the workers’ movement 
(including the Black liberation movement, since most Blacks are workers), and the student 
movement.  On the basis of the Work-In we feel that it is possible and necessary to ally with 
workers to defeat racism, to end wars like Vietnam, and to fight for social justice in our 
common interest against the common enemy.”
 33
  This statement reflected the ways in which 
the students saw themselves as the “new-working-class,” allied with the workers against a 
common corporate enemy—factory bosses and university administrators. 
The Work-In affirmed for its participants the necessity of the long-heralded SDS goal 
of a student-worker alliance.  As one student wrote, “Two main ideas were expressed: one, 
that students were impotent by themselves to make the changes that they wanted to see, and 
that workers had both an interest in these changes and the power to make them; secondly, 
that the university administrations that we fought were run by corporation owners—their 
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  Some students began to actively refocus on building the elusive worker-student 
alliance.  One instance of note was student support of a wildcat strike at the Ford plant in 
Mahwah, New Jersey, in April of 1969, where the position of black workers at the plant 
provided an organizing issue for SDS activists to ally with the union.
35
  The repeated and 
consistent struggle of the student movement to reach out to the labor movement against a 
common enemy attests to the importance that SDS continued to place on the labor 
movement, despite their sometimes flippant attitude to this “old” institution.  Although 
somewhat isolated instances of success exist in actions like the Boston Work-In, strike 
support, and the campus worker-student alliance, overall the growing differences between the 
working and middle classes in the United States drove rifts between the students and the 
unions. 
 
THE 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 
In his study of the Macomb County electorate, Middle Class Dreams, Stanley 
Greenberg asserts: “Every election now is an expression of this new era where revolt is 
commonplace.”
36
  This “now” arguably began with the 1968 election, and particularly with 
the 1968 Democratic primary elections.  George Wallace’s third-party candidacy presented 
an alarmingly substantial challenge to the Democratic constituency.  President Lyndon B. 
Johnson had taken himself out of the race, so Eugene McCarthy, Robert Kennedy, and Vice 
President Hubert Humphrey constituted the primary Democratic candidates.  1968 promised 
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to be a decisive and dividing year for liberalism.  The second generation of the New Left—
by this time original members like Haber, Flacks, and even Hayden were considered old and 
even irrelevant by many of the new anti-war recruits—rejected the Democratic Party as 
illegitimate and unrepresentative.  They came to refute, also, those institutions with their 
“eggs in the democratic basket,” such as the labor movement.  UAW historian John Barnard 
dates the breakdown of the New Left-labor alliance to the Vietnam War, when, “The UAW’s 
failure to condemn the war on moral and ideological grounds and break with the Johnson 
administration over it was taken as proof of a corrupt alliance with ‘the establishment.’”  
Soon, many within the student movement actively and harshly criticized the labor movement.  
Barnard reports, “The hostility of the New Left to labor weakened the position of the doves 
in the UAW hierarchy, leading Emil Mazey to charge that the New Left ‘did a great deal of 
disservice to those of use who felt strongly about Vietnam.’”
37
  Throughout the sixties, SDS 
and the UAW constantly attempted to nurture the evident seed for cooperation, but the 
incompatible extreme elements of each—the radical hippie manifestation of the youth 
movement, and the reactionary racist blue collar worker—proved devastating images.  
Moreover, the labor movement had attached itself to the Democratic Party long ago, for 
better or for worse, severely hobbling its ability to enact meaningful critical pressure despite 
widespread working-class opinion against the Vietnam War.  Labor and liberalism 
confronted a student movement committed to issues and devoted to a corresponding 
morality, both values requiring the students’ immovable resistance to the Vietnam War, 
opposition trumping party affiliation and domestic politics.  Neither organization could 
endorse the Democratic Party in 1968 and maintain absolute integrity. 
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In 1968, the forces of the sixties imploded.  The Tet Offensive early that year made it 
painfully clear to the concerned American public that the conflict in Vietnam was not a small 
insurrection, and that the American government had been deliberately lying about the war 
abroad.  Soon thereafter, Robert Kennedy announced his candidacy for the Democratic 
nomination, President Johnson announced that he would not run for the ticket, and SDS felt 
like they were exercising real power over the decisions and course of American liberalism. 
Then, four days later, Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated and riots erupted throughout 
the country.  Columbia students went on strike in April and “liberated” the university, 
evidence of how quickly the student movement was outgrowing SDS.  Soon after this 
dramatic student victory, Senator Kennedy was assassinated.
38
  His death was a crippling 
blow to many of the New Left “Old Guard,” as Leaders like Hayden saw Kennedy as a last 
hope and an embodiment of what their generation had experienced.
39
   
Finally, in late August 1968, at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, the 
forces of sixties liberalism descended upon the city. The Berkeley Free Speech Movement, 
the Columbia University occupation, the double assassinations of 1968, and mainstream 
liberalism’s endorsement of Hubert Humphrey combined to push the student movement 
outside of the traditional politic in Chicago.  Said SDS member Jane Adams, by 1968, “we 
were no longer appealing to the powers to be to do their job right; we were saying you’re 
doing your job wrong and we’re going to stop you.”
40
 
                                                
38
 Summary from interviews in Garvy, Rebels With a Cause.  There are also books which focus solely on the 
year 1968, including Walter LeFeber’s Deadly Bet: LBJ, Vietnam, and the 1968 Election, David Caute’s The 
Year of the Barricades: A Journey Through 1968, David Farber’s Chicago ’68, and Mark J. Davis’ film 1968, 
Young blood. 
39
 Miller, Democracy is in the Streets, 293-294. 
40
 Garvy, Rebels With a Cause. 
97 
 
Walter Reuther’s biographer, historian Nelson Lichtenstein, sharply remarked, 
“Reuther’s persistent failure to divorce his person and his union from the administration’s 
war program squandered a real chance to link at least one important institution of the 
working class to the thousands of men and women energized by the movement against the 
war.”
 41
  A break with the Democratic Party platform would have been risky, but Lichtenstein 
suggested that such a split, “might well have legitimized political opposition on an even 
wider scale and provided, in the words of ADA Chairman John Kenneth Galbraith, ‘the 
political strength, disciplined troops and stability’ that the new politics sorely lacked.”
 42
   
Therefore, the UAW missed an opportunity to galvanize a liberal coalition with the political 
clout to challenge established institutions. As Barnard concludes, “The UAW’s hope that a 
new, idealistic youth movement would form part of a progressive coalition with the UAW 
was another casualty of Vietnam.”
43
   Lichtenstein wrote, “Reuther’s caution meant that he 
had abdicated any meaningful role for himself or for his union in shaping the American New 
Left he so earnestly sought to build.  ‘If Reuther had marched with King against the war, it 
would have made all the difference in the world,’ mused one Berkeley activist.”
44
  Walter 
Reuther remained loyal to the Democratic Party despite his dovish instincts, determining that 
his union’s interest in the domestic agenda of Johnson’s Great Society was of higher priority 
than the turmoil surrounding the administration’s Cold War foreign policy.  Indeed, 
“Throughout the late 1960s the most explosive fissure within the white working class was not 
Vietnam but race relations, and on this issue Reuther did not hesitate to champion racial 
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liberalism, even when it provoked rank-and-file resentment.”
 45
  Reuther was willing to risk a 
split with the union membership on the basis of race, but assumed that the rank-and-file 
endorsed the United States’ actions in Vietnam when, in fact, they did not. 
 Much of the labor movement rank-and-file did not feel represented within the 
Democratic Party.  Many of them supported Robert Kennedy and George Wallace because 
they felt that, each in his own way, these men spoke for them at a time when their voices 
were lost.  When Alabama’s Governor Wallace, the man who had sworn “segregation now, 
segregation forever,” gained credible support in Michigan in 1968, Reuther and the UAW 
leadership became rightfully alarmed.  The riots of the late sixties ignited suburban concern 
about crime and racial strife, and busing controversies had introduced the explicit race 
problems of the South to the urban and metropolitan North.  To many, it seemed that “the 
federal government that had helped create their world was now wholly biased against them,” 
and Governor Wallace’s populist rhetoric appealed to the suburban white ethnic communities 
that comprised much of the UAW membership. The Wallace campaign ultimately provoked 
a break between the UAW leadership and rank-and-file, and Lichtenstein wrote that the 
UAW effort to block Wallace’s nomination was “unquestionably the unions finest hour in 
1968, a last hurrah for Reutherite labor-liberalism.”
46
 
 With the loss of Robert Kennedy, McCarthy unable to provide viable contention, and 
Wallace effectively marginalized, Hubert Humphrey stepped into the party’s void.  Although 
leaders like Reuther were pushing Humphrey to adopt a peace platform, his nomination was 
unacceptable for the New Left; they rejected the Democratic Party outright as “illegitimate 
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  Thus, SDS planned a demonstration at the upcoming Democratic 
National Convention in Chicago.  In preparation, Tom Hayden and Rennie Davis issued 
“Perspectives on Democratic National Convention” with the disclaimer, “This draft is merely 
to stimulate discussion: in no sense should it be considered a final proposal.”  They sought to 
emphasize the interrelatedness of the war in Vietnam with the domestic racial crisis.  The 
men wrote: “We can hasten the death of the traditional Democratic coalition by working 
among the constituencies with past loyalties to the Party: black people, the young, suburban 
liberals, trade unionists, the students and intellectuals.”  They added, “we must keep open the 
possibility of cooperation with insurgent groups inside the Democratic Party.  We can do this 
either from the perspective that greater trouble within the Party is useful, or from the 
perspective of including some Democratic-oriented elements in our overall coalition.  […]  
We must argue with the ‘dissident Democrats’ that their own party is the obstacle even to the 
social change they want.”
 48
 
In their proposal for Chicago, Davis and Hayden recognized the need for the order 
and maturity that characterized the 1965 March on Washington:  “The election year 
campaign should not be focused on v[io]lence and disruption against the convention. […] We 
have no illusions about the distortions which are inevitable from Time magazine and the rest 
of the mass media.”
 49
  They advised, “We must make an absolutely clear commitment to 
nonviolent tactics, develop a simple and clear political message that large numbers of 
Americans can understand, carry out effective local organizing which can interpret the 
national program and, finally, mobilize an assembly of people too large to be considered a 
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  Furthermore, the organizers did not focus singularly on protesting the 
Vietnam War.  They proposed that at the Convention, SDS protest in “waves”—the first 




 Come August, order crumbled quickly in Chicago, as destructive and reactive 
violence swept through the Windy City.  Abbie Hoffman’s Yippies joined radical anarchic 
elements of the SDS second generation and other volatile factions, and the ensuing chaos 
provided a sensational representation for the average Americans watching the national news.  
On coverage of Chicago, “Television had shown them a mob of long-haired kids—spoiled 
brats, they seemed to some—hurling curses and changing slogans and waving Communist 
flags.  A lot of people thought Hayden a firebrand and a rabble-rouser.  Period.”
52
  Chicago 
exposed the fatal divisions within the New Left and contributed to their distance from the 
liberal mainstream, and alienated many Americans from liberalism itself.  In “Notes on a 
Decade Ready for the Dustbin,” Carl Oglesby declared: “Chicago, in any case, occasioned 
these two terminal movements: the humiliation of liberalism, and the ‘official’ reversion of 
SDS to a Marxist-Leninist worldview.”
53
  He summarized the event: “Chicago: (1) 
Liberalism has no power in this country.  It is not politically organized.  The few secondary 
institutions in which it lives its hand-to-mouth existence are, at best, nothing more than 
insecure and defenseless sanctuaries.  In none of the estates—not the church, not the media, 
not the schools—does it exhibit the least aggressiveness, the least staying power, the least 
confidence.  […] [The liberals] were helpless at Chicago, and their helplessness has only 
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  In The Sixties, SDS leader Todd Gitlin echoed Oglesby’s 
assessment: “The tear-gas clouds and media spotlights during the Democratic convention 
polarized public opinion and established a new threshold for militancy while fatally 
discrediting the Democrats.”
55
  The violence in Chicago conclusively hurt Humphrey’s 
campaign, and for the first time in twenty years, the Democratic Party did not begin their 





THE DEATH OF SDS 
Give us a more careful look before you go 
joining the young peoples front for 





In 1969, Carl Oglesby claimed of the early years of SDS, in the age of Port Huron, 
ERAP, and before Vietnam began to escalate wildly: “Whenever it began, this was the 
Heroic Period, the movement’s Bronze Age.  In transition ever since, the movement has yet 
to prove it will have a Classical Period, but maybe we’re on the verge.”
58
  Instead, the anti-
war movement quickly transformed SDS from an organization comprised essentially of a 
circle of friends to a “three-ring circus.”
59
  The organization outgrew itself, and the 
challenges of maintaining the ambiguous ideal of participatory democracy in a group of tens 
of thousands of people resulted in self-destructive factionalization.  As the anti-war 
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movement gained momentum and the New Left became increasingly militant, SDS—in its 
true constitution—ceased to exist as a viable national organization. 
The women’s movement began to emerge in the late sixties, marked by the 
publication of “Sex and Caste” by Casey Hayden and Mary King, both members of SNCC.
60
  
SDS member Jane Adams later wondered, “what is it in our upbringing, what is it in our 
background,” that created the middle-class assumptions of SDS organizers about women.  
These internal conflicts began to contradict the directions of the movement, and the women 
of the New Left split off from groups like SDS to create their own feminist faction.  Women 
had begun to realize that, despite doing much of the work within SDS, they were never 
elected leaders.  As the greater youth movement gained momentum, female students saw an 
“opportunity to change the world, grab it, let’s do it.”
61
  The women’s liberation movement, 
or second-wave feminism, began to defect from established New Left organizations where 
they were unrepresented in order to form their own groups.
62
 
 Significantly, SDS’s decline was not entirely self-inflicted.  As the movement gained 
prominence in the later half of the sixties, the government began to actively monitor SDS, 
and successfully infiltrated the organization.  Alarmed by the success of the anti-war 
demonstration in the capital in 1965, at a time when SDS was ironically over concerned with 
its internal democracy, the government red-baited the organization in the mass media, 
prompting accusations of Communist-fronting; a grave statement in the McCarthy/HUAC 
era.  The situation prompted SDS President Paul Booth to issue a press release clarifying the 
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position of SDS in 1965, which coined the mantra “Build, Not Burn,” embraced by the anti-
war movement.  Booth defended SDS, stating: “We are anxious to advance the cause of 
democracy.  We do not believe that cause can be advanced by torture and terror.”  He 
referred to ERAP as an example of the tenacity and credibility of SDS organizers: “Our 
generation is not afraid of service for long years and low pay; SDS has been working for 
years in the slums of America at $10 a week to build a movement for democracy there.”  
Booth thereby connected SDS to the working class, and he continued to defend the students, 
likely against criticism for automatic draft deferments: “We are not afraid to risk our lives—
we have been risking our lives in Mississippi and Alabama, and some of us died there.  But 
we will not bomb the people, the women and children of another country …. Let us see what 
happens if service to democracy is made grounds for exemption from the military draft.  I 
predict that almost every member of my generation would chose to build, not burn.”
63
  
However, even Booth’s eloquence ultimately suggested the inevitable destruction of the 
organization he was trying to buttress; the membership became vocally angry that Booth 
spoke on their behalf without first insuring that he was supported by a consensus. 
This environment made leadership impossible, and combined with the pressures 
imposed upon SDS by the United States government surveillance, the student movement 
began to collapse upon itself.  In fact, government investigation of the student left in the 
sixties echoed similar tactics used against the “Old Left” of the 1930s.
64
 To warn members 
that federal agents were watching them, SDS published and circulated a letter to one SDS 
member from his father, a professor informed of his son’s visit to an SDS conference in 
Michigan by government intelligence.  In the letter, the father warned his son: “Please get the 
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hell out of the movement, shave your beard and cut your hair and stay out of the organized 
protests.  There are times when I know what I am talking about.  Love, Dad.”
65
 
The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation kept a “Rabble Rouser Index” and 
began infiltration of the New Left with its COINTELPRO program.  A terrible irony, 
COINTELPRO used illegal methods (e.g., they would force entry into SDS offices by 
claiming there was a fire) to try to subvert a society trying to hold the United States 
government to their own rules.  The FBI had people following certain SDS members 
constantly in an attempt to “neutralize” them, and some members of SDS were indicted.
 66
 
Eventually, the original New Left experienced some of the inherent paradox of a 
student movement, when the founders of SDS became too old for the movement they built.  
Compounding this dilemma, many of the activists expressed hesitancy to speak up during the 
struggle to accommodate the rapid influx of new membership.  James Miller described this 
intrinsic challenge in Democracy is in the Streets: “they were handcuffed by their own 
ideology: power struggles weren’t part of their democratic credo.  They also did not want to 
be considered old fogeys—they were proud to be a part of a radical avant-garde.  Besides, the 
organization they had created was Students for a Democratic Society.  Nobody wanted to be 
the next Michael Harrington.”
67
  The new SDS membership attracted by the anti-war 
movement swept the Old Guard from leadership at SDS’s 1966 conference. 
 SDS held their 1969 National Convention at the site of the 1968 chaos: Chicago.  
From June 18-22 of the last year of the sixties, SDS completed its self-destruction.  Two 
distinctive factions developed within the organization: the militant, anarchic and 
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unashamedly violent Weathermen, and the Marxist-Leninist Progressive Labor Party division 
or RYM II (Revolutionary Youth Movement).  Neither of these factions sought to create a 
more democratic society; SDS had ceased to embody its own ideals.  The Weatherman set up 
headquarters in New York, and the RYM II faction took over the Chicago national office.  As 
historian G. Louis Heath points out, “There was little to appeal to a college youth in the 
Weathermen’s position that youths should quit school to join a movement of revolutionary 
cadres and that all schools should be shut down.  Some chapters publicly changed their name 
or dissolved in an effort to disassociate themselves from Weatherman violence.”
 68
  The 
student movement alienated students: “A particularly troubling aspect of SDS tactics was the 
willingness to use the most violent and obnoxious means to reach SDS goals, such as the 
seizure of the university buildings, disruption of classes, holding administrators hostage, and 
the silencing of those who disagreed with SDS objectives.  Such tactics are anathema to the 
principles of academic freedom which undergird the entire educational system.”
69
  SDS’s 
second generation was out of touch with not only the mass of the American people but also 
their basic demographic, students.  Thus, in the wake of the growth that allowed for 
factionalization in the first place, the organization Students for a Democratic Society had 
become anti-Student and anti-Democratic, and even, in the anarchic manifestation of the 
Weathermen, anti-Society.  By the 1969 Convention, SDS was dead, cold in the grave. 
 The Old Guard of SDS decentralized and focused on local projects, and some, such as 
Paul Booth, even became union organizers.  Tom Hayden entered mainstream Democratic 
politics in the 1970s after a brief flirtation with the counter-culture.  In 1969, the year of the 
SDS death rattle, Carl Oglesby warned the movement of its “vanguarditis,” and called for a 
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revived willingness to work within established political avenues: “it is not lost causes, 
however heroic, or martyrs, however fine, that our movement needs.  It needs shrewd 
politicians and concrete social programs.”
70
  Oglesby asked that the students cease being so 
unwaveringly anti-bourgeois, which alienated their liberal allies.  He warned, “if SDS 
continues the past year’s vanguarditis, then it, at least, will have precious little future at all.  
For what this movement needs is a swelling base, not a vanguard.”  SDS’s “vanguarditis” did 
provide a swelling base, but not for the Democratic Party, liberalism, or the Left in any form.  
Rather, Richard Nixon and the Republican Party adopted the populist potential of 
participatory democracy to capitalize on the middle-class, white, suburban base that SDS had 
consistently refused to address. 
 
THE TROUBLED AMERICANS 
SDS historian G. Louis Heath summarized: “In 1960, an embryonic organization of 
students reached out to channel the exploding idealism of young white American concern for 
civil rights into an effective instrument for correcting some of the inequities and inadequacies 
of this most affluent and fundamentally free society.”  Eventually,  “The Students for a 
Democratic Society became a misnomer. […] What the Students for a Democratic Society 
promised at the end was the destruction of democratic society.”
71
  In recognition of this 
destructive quality, SDS patron Walter Reuther warned the students against violence, and in 
a 1970 interview recalled: “I said [to them] we knew what we were fighting for [during the 
birth of the UAW].  And you only know what you’re fighting against.  And that’s not good 
enough.  You have no moral right to destroy something unless you think you’ve got 
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something better to put in its place.”
72
  SDS began in the early sixties fighting for democracy, 
but by the end of the decade the organization had devolved in anarchy, demonstrated tangibly 
in the destruction at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago. 
The chaos accompanying the destruction of the liberal coalition inspired national fear 
that contributed to the election of Richard Nixon in 1968.  However, as Greenberg points out 
in his analysis of the oscillating electoral patterns of the post-Kennedy years, “Racial 
conservatism helped break the Democratic hold on middle America, but it did not renew the 
Republican party.  It created, instead, a new rootlessness and volatility.”
73
  Nixon won the 
1968 presidential election on a platform of law and order, anti-busing, and by vocally 
associating himself with the “forgotten” working class.  Meanwhile, Detroit and its lifeblood, 
auto manufacturing, suffered immensely in the wake of deindustrialization, culminating in 
the 1967 race riots.
74
  The UAW continued to struggle to cope with the changing American 
work force.  Despite consistent arguments by both SDS and the UAW leadership for the need 
to organize the white-collar workforce, this necessary effort never materialized.  Neither SDS 
nor the UAW led the progressive vanguard in the United States.   
The failure to organize the Southern work force proved to be a critical defeat for the 
labor movement. Even in Michigan, the UAW was losing authority.  In 1972, George 
Wallace won the Michigan Democratic Primary and 66% of the vote in definitively blue 
collar Macomb County although the UAW did not support him.  Much of Wallace’s support 
emerged due to increasing racial backlash to a September 1971 busing order for metropolitan 
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  The failure to create a worker-student alliance in the sixties, the goal of both SDS 
and the UAW, resulted in fragmentation within the working and middle classes.  This fissure 
did not cause, but contributed to, the election of conservative presidents like Nixon and 
Reagan, who adopted the populist rhetoric of the student and labor movements to recruit 
Middle America.  As James Miller observed, the original strategy of SDS, “had in some 
measure succeeded, only to create new—and unintended—opportunities for a kind of 
counterrevolution.  Under the administration of President Reagan, it was neoconservatives 
who reaped the benefits of what the New Left, before its sudden collapse, had helped to 
sow—the delegitimation of liberal corporatism and the ideal of the welfare state.”
76
  The 
relationship between the UAW and SDS in the sixties reveals important trends in American 
politics that continue to this day; the story of SDS and the UAW illustrates the historical 
contingency of the American working class.  
In the early sixties, the United States “discovered” the poor whites of Harrington’s 
The Other America.  In the late sixties, America “discovered” the white working class.  This 
new population emerged under several titles: the Silent Majority, the Troubled American, the 
Middle American.  The exposure of the angry American middle began with the revelation 
that 56% of Americans sympathized with the police, and not the demonstrators or the press, 
after the violence of the 1968 Chicago Convention.  Walter Reuther was shocked at this 
statistic, fearing that it portended a police state.
77
  In Fear of Falling, her analysis of 
American working-class consciousness, Barbara Ehrenreich remarks on the national 
recognition of its blue collar: “They showed scattered signs of discontent that became, in the 
media, a full-scale backlash: against the civil rights movement, the anti-war movement, and 
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apparently against middle-class liberalism in general.”  Indeed, “as the news media presented 
it, a blue-collar vanguard was leading Middle America in its shift to the right.”  The media 
“did not discover the working class that was – in the late sixties and early seventies – caught 
up in the greatest wave of labor militancy since World War II.”  Instead, this discovery 
focused on the “dumb, reactionary, and bigoted” blue-collar men of the majority.
 78
  The 
media portrayed the working class as racist and uneducated, which insured their alienation 
from the student movement. 
 The October 6, 1968, issue of Newsweek featured the cover story “The Troubled 
American: A Special Report on the White Majority,” based on a poll of 2,165 white 
Americans.  The article claimed that “the middle American malaise” went down to the 
fundamental “sanctity of work and the stability of the family, of whether a rewarding middle-
class life is still possible in modern America.”
 79
  Strangely, some of the report’s assessments 
echo The Port Huron Statement: “There is a pervasive feeling of being cheated by the 
affluent society. […] But most of all there is a sense of loss and neglect.”
 80
  The article’s poll 
revealed that the majority of Middle Americans opposed United States involvement in 
Vietnam, but were not sure how to disengage “with honor,” and liked Nixon but were not 
overly excited about him.  Furthermore, “despite his rejection of campus revolutionaries, the 
average white has a favorable attitude about young people and thinks much of their criticism 
of society is warranted.”
81
  However, the eponymous citizen detected an “anti-middle class 
bias” among the college radicals, and 84% of those polled felt that the demonstrators had 
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been treated too “leniently,” while only 11% disagreed with that statement.
82
  A quote in a 
Time celebration of “Man and Woman of the Year: The Middle Americans,” expressed 
working-class frustration with the disrespectful college radicals: “Our boys don’t smoke pot 




Less than two years later, the labor unionist construction workers of the 1970 Hard 
Hat Riots on Wall Street shouted their support for the Republican president and announced 
their love for the establishment.  Throughout the month of May, The New York Times 
reported on the clash between the workers and the students and reactions to the incident from 
across the country.  The initial report described the incident: “The hardhats, long scornful of 
excesses by privileged longhairs on campus, were obviously delighted at the opportunity to 
pour out their hatred on the students and any who dare to raise a voice in their defense.”
84
  
The men who had elected Richard Nixon based on his commitment to law and order were 
“chasing youths through the canyons of the financial district in a wild noontime melee.”85  
One longshoreman’s wife, Dolores Fanale, watched from her job on Wall Street and wanted to 
join the men: “We wanted to tell off those kids.  They have too much.”86  Lawrence Eliot of 
the Building and Construction Trades Council, the responsible union, observed: “That the 
attackers should be members of a union is only sad evidence of how far we have slipped from 
the time when unionism meant striving for human decency and social justice.”87 
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From the reportage, Eliot clearly represented the minority, and Middle Americans 
from New York to North Carolina expressed, in class-conscious terms, their support of the 
workers, opposition to the escalating Vietnam War, and their resentment of the students.  The 
New York Times quoted Cecil Onion, secretary-treasurer of the Electrical, Radio and Machine 
Workers Union: “I would say the majority were opposed to the decision to go into 
Cambodia.  They feel that the students should have a right to dissent.  They can’t understand 
how the students can tear up their own facilities.  They are paying high tuition and see the 
schools closed down.  Their kids missing class.  This isn’t right.”  A steel worker in 
Youngstown, Ohio said the consensus agreed, “the students got what was coming to them.”  
And Wayne Haynes from Wixom, Michigan’s Local 26 of the UAW said that the workers 
“wanted more force to be used” against the demonstrators.88  Labor historian Jefferson Cowie 
reports that the use of the Hard Hat Riots to create an image of a pro-war working class was 
unqualified, and “manual workers were more opposed to the war and more in favor of 
withdrawal than were the college educated.” 89  Backlash rhetoric and reactions were not 
stands on foreign policy, as the incident and aftermath “did not reflect support for the war so 
much as reveal class resentments of workers towards the protestors’ methods, privilege, and 
apparently nonexistent sense of duty.” 90 
The students and workers formed an unexpected coalition, in the end—The New York 
Times equated the hard hats with their student counterparts: “They have now joined the 
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revolutionaries and bombthrowers on the left in demonstrating that anarchy is fast becoming a 
mode of political expression.”91  The labor movement and the student movement, overtaken 
by extreme manifestations, had each ceased to embody their own definitive former democratic 
ideals and progressive ideology.  Although the Hard Hat Riots were rightfully alarming, they 
do not represent a symbolic culmination of the story of labor and the left or of workers and 
students in the 1960s.  As the complicated, complex relationship sustained over the course of 
the decade between Students for a Democratic Society and the United Auto Workers 
demonstrates, students and workers continually attempted to reach to each other in the 
interest of a broader liberal alliance.  Although they managed temporary contact in 
collaborations such as the Economic Research and Action Project, the structural opposition 
exposed by their political relationship to liberalism in the Vietnam War prevented these 
factions from a genuine coalition.  This fragmentation and alienation is a dilemma that 
continues to plague student activists, labor unions, and the Democratic Party well into the 
present day. 
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